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THE NEW FAMILY FREEDOM 
EMILY J. STOLZENBERG* 
Abstract: In family law, “autonomy” has traditionally meant freedom from 
state interference in one’s intimate life. This Article describes an emergent, 
libertarian vision of autonomy as property rights that also demands freedom 
from other family members. This conception, “choice about obligations,” 
holds redistribution of resources between intimates to be illegitimate unless 
the richer party “chose” to take on financial obligations ex ante by ceremoni-
ally marrying or formally contracting. But as more people conduct their inti-
mate lives outside these legal institutions, choice about obligations increasing-
ly collides with another, more fundamental, family law principle: the impera-
tive to “privatize dependency,” i.e., to redistribute resources between family 
members in lieu of publicly supporting those who cannot support themselves. 
This conflict is insoluble on its own terms and creates persistent doctrinal 
problems in the modern law of family obligations. Parentage law, cohabitant 
property-division claims, and alimony each present the clash between a richer 
party’s interest in avoiding “unchosen” family obligations and the state’s in-
terest in avoiding responsibility for citizens’ material needs. Against the back-
drop of scant collective support, the law denies the importance of freedom to 
privatize dependency in parent-child relationships and vindicates “choice” in 
adult relationships by requiring adults to self-support, all the while insisting 
that intimates “assumed the risk” of obligation or economic loss. Thus, despite 
attempts to dispel it through doctrinal workarounds, legal fictions, or willful 
ignorance, the tension remains. The incompatibility between choice about ob-
ligations and privatizing dependency also reveals a deep normative tension in 
the law, for both principles originate in the current neoliberal moment. Ne-
oliberal commitments shape modern family law, but prove both incoherent 
and deficient as a framework for intimate relationships. As currently struc-
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tured, family law fails to recognize and further the vital role that families play 
in meeting their members’ deepest human needs. To better conceptualize the 
rights and responsibilities attending intimacy, modern family law should re-
think its approaches to both autonomy and dependency. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent Supreme Court pronouncements suggest that family relation-
ships help individuals to achieve freedom. Obergefell v. Hodges recognized 
the right of same-sex couples to marry in part because “choices concerning 
. . . family relationships” “define personal identity and beliefs.”1 Calling such 
“intimate choices” “central to” and “inherent in the concept of individual au-
tonomy,” the opinion forged a tight positive link between family relationships 
and freedom.2 
But the link need not be positive. Against Obergefell, modern family law 
increasingly understands autonomy also to require freedom from other family 
members. This “new family freedom” rejects as illegitimate any attempt to 
redistribute resources between intimates unless the richer party “chose” to 
take on family obligations ex ante by ceremonially marrying or formally con-
tracting. But as more people conduct their intimate lives outside legal institu-
tions,3 this libertarian vision collides with another, more fundamental, family 
law principle: the imperative to “privatize dependency,” i.e., to redistribute 
resources between intimates in lieu of the state providing resources to meet 
dependents’ needs.4 The new family freedom and privatized dependency both 
pervade modern family law, and yet, as the following cases illustrate, they are 
often mutually exclusive: 
• A sixteen-year-old babysitter seduces her twelve-year-old charge. Alt-
hough she is adjudicated a juvenile offender for her conduct, the court 
nonetheless orders the boy to financially support the resulting child.5 
• A couple cohabits for fifteen years, holding themselves out as married 
and raising three children. The woman devotes herself to parenting and 
                                                                                                                           
 1 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597, 2599 (2015). 
 2 Id. at 2597, 2599; see also id. at 2599 (referring to an “abiding connection between marriage 
and liberty”). 
 3 Over 18 million Americans currently live in unmarried cohabitant households. Kaiponanea 
T. Matsumura, Consent to Intimate Regulation, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1016 (2018). See generally 
Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. 
L. REV. 167 (2015) (discussing how family law regulates nonmarital families). 
 4 Although I follow other scholars’ lead in using the term “privatizing dependency,” see infra 
notes 29, 63–72 and accompanying text, “private responsibility for dependency” is perhaps a more 
accurate description of the phenomenon. 
 5 State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1274, 1279 (Kan. 1993). 
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supporting the man’s education and professional career. Because the 
couple never formally married, however, the court rejects her claim for 
an equal share of the property accumulated during the relationship.6 
• A permanently brain-damaged wife seeks continuing spousal support 
after a 70-month marriage. Although the husband is able to pay, the 
court terminates support after fifty-eight months, reasoning that his ob-
ligation ends “at [that] point in time.”7 
Each of these cases presents an irreconcilable conflict between the new 
family freedom and privatizing dependency. In the first case, excusing the 
boy from support liability would harm the innocent child, who bears no re-
sponsibility for the means of her conception.8 In the second case, the wom-
an assisted the man in acquiring assets and sacrificed significant opportuni-
ties in reliance on the relationship, yet the court’s decision leaves her with 
nothing.9 In the third case, the ex-wife is left to subsist on meager disability 
benefits insufficient to ameliorate her poverty.10 In each case, the law must 
choose between competing commitments, one of which must give way to 
the other. 
This Article argues that the clash between the new family freedom and 
privatizing dependency creates persistent doctrinal and normative problems in 
the modern law of family obligations—the financial duties that attach to inti-
mate relationships.11 I describe the conflicting principles and situate them in 
the current neoliberal moment,12 before showing how their intersection cre-
ates chronic confusion in the laws of parentage, cohabitant obligations, and 
alimony.13 I argue that the principles’ core incompatibility reveals fundamen-
tal flaws in modern family law’s normative paradigms.14 I suggest some doc-
trinal reforms within the present system, but conclude that neoliberal com-
mitments are a poor fit for family life and that we should restructure family 
law around alternative approaches to autonomy and dependency.15 
                                                                                                                           
 6 Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1205, 1211 (Ill. 1979); see also Blumenthal v. Brewer, 
69 N.E.3d 834, 860 (Ill. 2016) (holding that Hewitt remains good law). 
 7 In re Marriage of Wilson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 522, 523–24 (Ct. App. 1988). 
 8 See Hermesmann, 847 P.2d at 1279.  
 9 See Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1205, 1211. 
 10 See Wilson, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 527; Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: 
Negative Liberty and Laissez-Faire Markets in the Minimal State, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
25, 36, 37 n.73 (2014). 
 11 See Katharine K. Baker, Homogeneous Rules for Heterogeneous Families: The Standardi-
zation of Family Law When There Is No Standard Family, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 320 (defining 
“the law of family obligations” as comprising “child support, property distribution, and alimony”). 
 12 See infra notes 36–124 and accompanying text (Part I). 
 13 See infra notes 125–310 and accompanying text (Part II). 
 14 See infra notes 313–346 and accompanying text (Part III.A). 
 15 See infra notes 347–382 and accompanying text (Part III.B and Conclusion). 
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This Article makes several contributions. First, I identify and describe 
a vision of autonomy as property rights that has emerged since the early 
1970s and explain how this conception—which I call “choice about obliga-
tions,” “choice logic,” or simply “choice”—undermines the law of family 
obligations.16 Whereas constitutional descriptions of autonomy contemplate 
the freedom to pursue chosen family relationships without state censure or 
with state recognition,17 choice logic defines autonomy also to include the 
freedom to avoid “unchosen” family obligations. But defining autonomy in 
this libertarian way undercuts the private support imperative, which attaches 
financial obligations to family relationships to avoid demands on the public 
fisc.18 Scholars have described how family law advances the state’s increas-
ingly pervasive and invasive efforts to privatize dependency,19 but they have 
yet to realize how the new family freedom complicates and delegitimizes 
that goal.  
The tension between choice about obligations and privatizing depend-
ency comes to a head in precisely those doctrinal areas whose proper regu-
lation has been the subject of long-standing, yet unresolved, scholarly de-
bate: the laws of parentage for purposes of child support, cohabitant proper-
ty division claims, and alimony.20 Men seeking to avoid paternal obligations 
ask why women may avoid maternal obligations through abortion or adop-
tion, whereas the public policy of “personal responsibility” denies them any 
such choice.21 In determining what cohabitants who neither ceremonially 
married nor formally contracted owe one other, the law must inevitably 
weigh the richer party’s interest in controlling (what he views as) his prop-
                                                                                                                           
 16 See infra notes 36–77 and accompanying text (Part I.A). 
 17 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 18 See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private Family Support, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 1835, 1866 (2014). 
 19 See, e.g., MELINDA COOPER, FAMILY VALUES: BETWEEN NEOLIBERALISM AND THE NEW 
SOCIAL CONSERVATISM 67–117 (2017); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY 
MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 228 (2004); Anne L. Alstott, Private Tragedies? Family Law 
as Social Insurance, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 3, 4 (2010); Susan Frelich Appleton, Between the 
Binaries: Exploring the Legal Boundaries of Nonanonymous Sperm Donation, 49 FAM. L.Q. 93, 
97 (2015) [hereinafter Appleton, Between the Binaries]; Susan Frelich Appleton, The Forgotten 
Family Law of Eisenstadt v. Baird, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 28 n.185 (2016) [hereinafter 
Appleton, Forgotten Family Law]; Melissa Murray, Family Law’s Doctrines, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 
1985, 1990, 2015–17 (2015); Rosenbury, supra note 18, at 1866–67; Robin West, From Choice to 
Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1409–12 
(2009). 
 20 Cf. Baker, supra note 11, at 320 (defining “family obligations” as “child support, property 
distribution, and alimony”). I examine property distribution between cohabitants instead of spous-
es because marital property obligations are arguably justified by consent to be married. See infra 
note 120 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 128–197 and accompanying text (Part II.A). 
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erty against assigning resources to the poorer party.22 And permanent ali-
mony pits an obligor’s property rights in his post-divorce income stream—a 
proposition ratified by no-fault divorce—against providing for a recipient’s 
ongoing financial need.23 In each of these doctrinal areas, the law cannot 
both privatize dependency and vindicate choice about obligations; instead, 
it must prioritize one of the competing values. 
Against the backdrop of our society’s refusal collectively to support 
family life, family law persists in privatizing dependency. It does so explicitly 
in the law of parentage, which concerns children developmentally incapable 
of meeting their own needs, and implicitly in the laws of cohabitant obliga-
tions and alimony, by deeming all adults capable of self-support. But harmo-
nizing the new family freedom with this institutional settlement requires fic-
tionalizing choice.24 Although family law insists that adult intimates “as-
sumed the risk” of obligation or economic loss by reading consent to legal 
consequences from causally attenuated conduct, this rhetoric denies the im-
portance of adult freedom in parent-child relationships and ignores dependen-
cy and interdependency in adult intimate relationships. Thus, despite attempts 
to reconcile autonomy with family obligations through doctrinal worka-
rounds, legal fictions, or willful ignorance, the tension between principles 
remains. 
This Article’s second contribution is to reveal a fundamental incoher-
ence within modern family law’s theoretical foundation. Far from discrete 
phenomena, the new family freedom and the private support imperative 
share roots in the current neoliberal moment. Although some scholars con-
tend that the term is “too vague or polemical for responsible use,” neoliber-
alism is a useful shorthand for an interrelated set of political, economic, and 
social policies and their justificatory apparatus.25 Since the 1970s, “a loose 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See infra notes 198–273 and accompanying text (Part II.B). Because choice about obliga-
tions functions from the title holder’s perspective, I use the term “redistribution” to describe the 
law’s assignment of entitlements between family members. Under different theories of ownership 
and obligation, however, these distributions of entitlement would not necessarily qualify as “redis-
tributive.” 
 23 See infra notes 274–307 and accompanying text (Part II.C). Because most alimony obligors 
are men and most recipients are women, I use the corresponding gendered pronoun for clarity’s 
sake. 
 24 Cf. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 4 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994) (describing the principle of “institutional settlement” as “the judgment that decisions which 
are the duly arrived at result of duly established procedures . . . ought to be accepted as binding 
upon the whole society unless and until they are duly changed”). 
 25 COOPER, supra note 19, at 18–19 (using “neoliberalism” to “refer . . . to the American 
schools of new economic liberalism . . . defined by the social and economic upheavals of the 
1960s and 70s” which “helped redefine the intellectual and popular consensus on state deficit 
spending, the role of the central bank, inflation, taxation, consumer protection laws, tuition fees, 
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constellation of thinkers, politicians, and activists” has worked “with re-
markable success to dismantle the American welfare state, to provide more 
control over labor for multinational corporations and more freedom for fi-
nance capital, [and] to facilitate a transfer of wealth . . . to a small upper 
class.”26 In support of these projects, proponents have “reviv[ed] . . . the 
doctrines of classical economic liberalism . . . in politics, ideas, and law,” 
articulating “an overlapping set of arguments and premises” that “tend[] to 
support market imperatives and unequal economic power.”27 Thus neoliber-
alism describes both a policy agenda and a “political rationality,” “a mode 
of governance encompassing but not limited to the state . . . that produces 
subjects, forms of citizenship and behavior, and a new organization of the 
social.”28 
Scholars have located modern family law’s approach to privatizing de-
pendency in neoliberalism,29 but they have yet to recognize how a particular 
neoliberal idea of autonomy also shapes family law doctrine. For in using 
choice-based arguments to resist assignment of resources to poorer family 
members, richer parties rely upon neoliberal premises, in particular that 
freedom consists in strong property entitlements and that property transfers 
are illegitimate absent title holders’ consent.30 The “assumption of risk” log-
ic that modern family law deploys in attempting to reconcile choice with 
privatized dependency also reflects the neoliberal insistence that “rationally 
calculating individual[s] bear[] full responsibility for the consequences of 
[their] action[s] no matter how severe the constraints on this action.”31 The 
clashing principles thus reveal a profound paradox of neoliberalism: It de-
mands macro-level structures that preclude its micro-level application in the 
family sphere. The neoliberal state depends, for its continued existence, up-
on constraining family members’ ability to “choose” their own obliga-
tions.32 Far from a coherent normative theory, neoliberalism proves to be a 
                                                                                                                           
and welfare”); David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 & n.3 (2014) (describing criticisms of term). 
 26 Angela P. Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs? Toward a Political Economy of Sexuali-
ty, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1539, 1555 (2006). 
 27 Grewal & Purdy, supra note 25, at 1–2. 
 28 WENDY BROWN, Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy, in EDGEWORK: CRITI-
CAL ESSAYS ON KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 37, 37 (2005). 
 29 See, e.g., Appleton, Forgotten Family Law, supra note 19, at 27–28, 41; Deborah Dinner, 
The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. 
79, 84, 87 (2016); Rosenbury, supra note 18, at 1869–70. 
 30 See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 7 (2005); Randy E. Barnett, A 
Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 299 (1986). 
 31 BROWN, supra note 28, at 42. 
 32 Cf. Nancy Fraser, Contradictions of Capital and Care, 100 NEW LEFT REV. 99, 99 (2016) 
(“No society that systematically undermines social reproduction can endure for long.”). 
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contingent historical phenomenon, an ideology that entrenches certain eco-
nomic, political, and social power structures.33 This insight denaturalizes 
neoliberalism as a framework for organizing collective life, rendering its 
normative primacy in family law ripe for challenge. 
Although neoliberal approaches to autonomy and dependency are a 
poor fit for family life, they shape modern family law. I therefore propose 
some incremental reforms to the law of family obligations, taking both 
choice logic and the current approach to dependency as fixed.34 In the law 
of parentage, I suggest eliminating or reducing paternal child-support liabil-
ity in the case of less-than-voluntary sexual conduct and rescinding policies 
that interfere with fathers’ ability to provide economic and emotional sup-
port. In the law of cohabitants, I propose tailoring different levels of obliga-
tions to different kinds of cohabitant relationships. And in the context of 
alimony, I propose redistributing resources between former spouses through 
unequal division of marital property, rather than post-divorce transfer pay-
ments. These proposals’ limitations prove the need for broader reform. For 
resolving family law’s underlying problems will require a concomitant 
transformation of our entire collective life—a project that calls for the atten-
tion and efforts of many. 
This Article’s final contribution is to highlight what a choice-based 
conception of freedom forecloses: consideration of alternative ways to un-
derstand autonomy within the family. Because family relationships ideally 
help individuals to meet some of their deepest human needs, family mem-
bers are not—and cannot and should not be—fully independent of one an-
other. A satisfactory conception of family autonomy must therefore account 
for the dependency and interdependency that attend intimacy. But choice 
logic, with its insistence on ex ante consent to obligation, rejects the moral 
fact that even intimacy unsanctioned by legal formality can belong within 
the sphere of family justice. Defining family freedom in terms of individual 
property rights precludes the law from embracing richer conceptions of au-
tonomy that understand one’s commitments, especially to intimates, as con-
sistent with and even necessary to freedom.35 With the limits of choice logic 
exposed, we can begin to consider how family relationships might support, 
rather than impede, their members’ pursuit of important life projects. 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 26, at 1556; Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citi-
zenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 784 & n.2 
(2003); cf. 1 KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 79–86 (C.J. Arthur 
ed., 1970) (1845). 
 34 See infra notes 347–372 and accompanying text (Part III.B). 
 35 See infra notes 378–382 and accompanying text. 
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes how the family’s re-
sponsibility for dependency shapes current family law doctrine and traces 
the ascendance of choice logic in modern family law. I situate both princi-
ples within the current neoliberal moment and explain how they set the 
stage for doctrinal conflict. Part II analyzes how the laws of parentage, co-
habitant obligations, and alimony inevitably require states and scholars to 
choose between principles, to either respect a view of autonomy requiring the 
richer party’s ex ante consent to family obligations or ensure that an econom-
ically vulnerable party’s needs are met. Part III exposes neoliberalism’s struc-
tural incoherence and normative unattractiveness as a framework for family 
life. I propose some interim reforms, but conclude that appropriately concep-
tualizing the rights and responsibilities attending intimacy requires rethink-
ing family law’s approaches to both autonomy and dependency. 
I. MODERN FAMILY VALUES 
The importance of autonomy and the family’s role in privatizing de-
pendency are both central premises of modern family law. On the surface, 
these phenomena appear to be distinct and even opposed: Scholars general-
ly applaud legal developments that further intimate self-determination, 
while criticizing the state’s refusal meaningfully to support the caregiving 
upon which society depends. But as this Part shows, both the private sup-
port imperative and an ascendant libertarian view of family autonomy orig-
inate in the current neoliberal moment. Although constitutional respect for 
autonomy protects many interests, including the freedom to pursue chosen 
family relationships, autonomy increasingly grounds claims that individuals 
should also be free to choose their family obligations—and by extension, to 
avoid family obligations that they did not “choose” ex ante. This conception 
of autonomy as financial freedom from other family members, which began 
to emerge in the early 1970s, reflects deeply ingrained neoliberal convic-
tions, namely that property cannot be legitimately transferred absent its 
owner’s consent. This new vision of family freedom conflicts with the thor-
oughgoing way in which modern family law privatizes dependency, which 
in turn can only be understood against the backdrop of our current minimal-
ist state. Family regulation based on marital status and formal contracting 
succeeds in balancing privatizing dependency with choice about obliga-
tions, but as ever more individuals conduct their intimate lives outside these 
traditional legal institutions, the two principles increasingly clash within the 
law of family obligations.  
1992 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1983 
A. Dependency and the Minimalist State 
Every society faces what we could call the “dependency problem.”36 
To ensure its self-perpetuation, a society requires the continued vitality of 
its members. But adults do not spring into being fully formed. Instead, they 
are born as vulnerable children who depend on others for the physical re-
sources, care, and guidance they need to develop the capacity for social 
membership.37 And because raising children is such intensive work, care-
givers must in turn depend on others to meet their own needs. Martha 
Fineman has described these respective phenomena as “inevitable” and “de-
rivative dependency.”38 
A society’s options for addressing dependency lie on a spectrum be-
tween two poles: ensuring collectively that the needs of those who cannot 
care for themselves are met, or assigning the responsibility to private parties 
or institutions.39 As scholars have recognized, the United States generally 
opts for the latter course by “privatizing dependency” within the family, 
primarily through the vehicle of family law.40 This policy choice requires 
American families to bear most of the costs of social reproduction, or “the 
biological reproduction of the next generation along with the subsistence, 
socialization, education, and caregiving of existing generations.”41 As a re-
sult, families are expected to “shoulder their own financial weight,” despite 
the fact that “society depends upon families to engage in social reproduc-
tion and has a stake in families successfully doing so.”42  
Although families have long been responsible for dependency, the law 
has defined and enforced their precise duties differently over time. At com-
mon law, for instance, the law of coverture and the doctrine of necessaries 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See generally FINEMAN, supra note 19. 
 37 See, e.g., MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND 
AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS 45–51 (2010). 
 38 FINEMAN, supra note 19, at 34–37. 
 39 See, e.g., LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALI-
TY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 21 (2006) (“A just society must ensure that its members are able to meet 
their basic needs for nurture, care, food, shelter, and other material goods.”). 
 40 See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 19, at 33; MCCLAIN, supra note 39, at 5 (arguing that in the 
U.S., “there is insufficient recognition of a public responsibility to support families’ efforts”); 
Dinner, supra note 29, at 84 (“[T]he United States tilts strongly in the direction of private respon-
sibility for social reproduction . . . .”); Maxine Eichner, The Privatized American Family, 93 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 213, 215–16 (2017) (arguing that the U.S. “stands alone in the degree of its 
failure” to recognize that “the distribution of conditions necessary for sound families is a basic 
responsibility of government”). 
 41 Dinner, supra note 29, at 84. 
 42 Eichner, supra note 40, at 214; MCCLAIN, supra note 39, at 5. 
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required a husband to support his wife and children.43 This obligation went 
hand-in-hand with male familial and political prerogative, for it was “[a] 
man’s . . . taking . . . responsibility for dependent wife and children [that] 
qualified him to be a participating member of a state.”44 In the late nine-
teenth century, married women’s property acts and earnings statutes relaxed 
the rules of coverture by permitting wives to hold property in their own 
names, to contract, and to claim rights in their own labor. These enactments 
preserved, however, the common-law expectation that married women 
would render household services in exchange for their husbands’ support.45 
Tort and criminal law similarly underscored the continuing importance of 
the family’s role in private provision: Breach-of-promise-to-marry suits 
permitted women to recover the “loss of the pecuniary and social ad-
vantages which the promised marriage offered,” while men charged with 
the crime of seduction could avoid prison by marrying and providing for 
their victims.46 Each form of legal liability understood marriage as the insti-
tution through which dependency needs were to be satisfied.47 
Legal developments beginning in the 1960s formally abolished the last 
vestiges of coverture while retaining the family’s historical support function 
in a transmuted form.48 The no-fault divorce revolution of the 1970s and 
                                                                                                                           
 43 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *430, *434–35 
(1765) (describing a husband’s duty “to provide his wife with necessities” and characterizing 
parents’ duty to support their children as “a principle of natural law”); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMEN-
TARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 146 (Charles M. Barnes ed., 13th ed. 1884); see also Earle v. Earle, 
43 N.W. 118, 119 (Neb. 1889) (“It is a well-established rule of law that it is the duty of the hus-
band to provide his family with support and means of living . . . and for this purpose the wife has 
generally the right to use his credit for the purchase of necessaries.”). 
 44 NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 7 (2000); cf. 
Rosenbury, supra note 18, at 1866 (“[S]tates originally recognized marriage and the parent-child 
relationship as a means to encourage men to assume responsibility for women’s and children’s 
dependencies.”). 
 45 See Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property Law: 1800–1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 
1409–12 (1983); Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning 
Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082–83 (1994); Reva B. Siegel, The 
Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860–1930, 82 
GEO. L.J. 2127, 2141 (1994). 
 46 Stanard v. Bolin, 565 P.2d 94, 96 (Wash. 1977); Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 32 (2012). 
 47 The government continues to view marriage as a solution to poverty. See, e.g., Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform’s Marriage Cure as the Revival of 
Post-Bellum Control, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1650 (2005) (describing marriage-promotion poli-
cies of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PWORA”) of 
1996). 
 48 See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996) (describing the “preservation through transformation” of “status 
regime[s]”); cf. Rosenbury, supra note 18, at 1866 (stating that “even as our understandings of 
 
1994 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1983 
1980s made private family law sex-neutral, a shift that confirmed fathers’ 
post-divorce custodial rights and child support obligations but limited 
women’s access to spousal support.49 The Supreme Court’s illegitimacy de-
cisions of the 1970s, accompanied by the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act, ex-
tended a parent’s duty of support to non-marital as well as marital chil-
dren.50 At the same time, welfare reforms from the 1970s through the 1990s 
restricted the availability of government aid for family life, enacting private 
provision norms into federal and state law in order to retrench the adminis-
trative state.51 In all of these ways, modern family law embodies the princi-
ple that the state bears little responsibility for the costs of social reproduc-
tion. 
The United States’ current extreme approach to the dependency prob-
lem is rooted in modern neoliberalism.52 Unlike the classical liberalism on 
which it draws, neoliberal “political rationality” seeks to organize collective 
life by “extending . . . market values to all institutions and social action.”53 
Neoliberalism “advocates the institution building, policies, and discourse 
development appropriate to” this “normative . . . claim about the pervasive-
ness of economic rationality,”54 “call[ing] for the abandonment of public 
space and public institutions and their replacement with market-produced 
private space and institutions.”55 Under neoliberalism, the state’s purpose 
shrinks from “furthering a broader range of public goods” to “creat[ing] and 
                                                                                                                           
family roles and composition have changed, legal recognition of family status remains rooted in 
the privatization of dependency”). 
 49 Dinner, supra note 29, at 83–84. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLU-
SION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991) (arguing that 
pursuit of formal equality negatively affects women and children). 
 50 See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 
U.S. 164, 172–76 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973). 
 51 See infra notes 135–140, 176–179 and accompanying text; see also Baker, supra note 11, 
at 329 (stating that the federal government required states to adopt child support guidelines in 
order to “secur[e] more private funds for low-income children so that those children would be less 
of a financial burden on the government”); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 47, at 1677 (“The thrust 
of PRWORA and related state legislation is to alleviate governmental responsibility where it can 
be privatized through the family.”). 
 52 See supra notes 25–33 and accompanying text. 
 53 BROWN, supra note 28, at 40 (emphasis omitted); id. at 42 (noting that “classical liberalism 
articulated a distinction . . . among the criteria for individual moral, associational, and economic 
actions”); see also HARVEY, supra note 30, at 3 (describing neoliberalism’s assertion “that the 
social good” is to be achieved “by maximizing the reach and frequency of market transactions, 
and . . . bring[ing] all human action into the domain of the market”); cf. Harris, supra note 26, at 
1557 (“The neoliberal project is not only a political and economic project, but also a cultural 
one.”). 
 54 BROWN, supra note 28, at 40. 
 55 Harris, supra note 26, at 1558. 
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preserv[ing]” the “structures and functions required to secure private prop-
erty rights and to guarantee . . . the proper functioning of markets.”56 Be-
cause neoliberalism espouses a “narrow[ed] vision of the role of govern-
ment,”57 it is sometimes said to advocate a “minimal” state.58 But because 
“the opposition between ‘market’ and ‘state’ . . . is nonsensical” and “the 
neoliberal position” is better understood as “a call for a particular kind of 
state,”59 I prefer and will use the term “minimalist.” 
Neoliberalism also makes demands upon individuals, “construct[ing]” 
them “as entrepreneurial actors in every sphere of life.”60 “[C]itizen-sub-
ject[s] of a neoliberal order” are “rational, calculating creatures whose moral 
autonomy is measured by their capacity for ‘self-care’—the ability to provide 
for their own needs and service their own ambitions.”61 Neoliberalism defines 
the “good citizen . . . as the enterprising, self-regulating subject who manages 
his or her own risk,” without imposing costs on the collective.62  
Scholars have begun to analyze how neoliberalism shapes family law. 
Anne Alstott argues that modern family law reflects the commitment to 
“three core” neoliberal tenets: “negative liberty, laissez-faire market distri-
butions and the minimal state.”63 Because constitutional law protects indi-
viduals from state interference in their family lives but refuses to redistrib-
ute resources to alleviate harsh market outcomes, state-level family law can 
do no more than divide a family’s resources between its members; depen-
dency needs must be met through private resources, or not at all.64 “The 
entrenched neoliberalism of family law” thus “blocks sustained considera-
                                                                                                                           
 56 HARVEY, supra note 30, at 2; Eichner, supra note 40, at 218; see also BRENDA COSSMAN, 
SEXUAL CITIZENS: THE LEGAL AND CULTURAL REGULATION OF SEX AND BELONGING 10 (2007) 
(“Governments are no longer responsible for ensuring even the most basic economic well-being of 
their citizens. Individuals must assume that responsibility and ensure their individual self-reliance 
through the market.”); Harris, supra note 26, at 1558 (“Neoliberal policies devolve issues formerly 
considered collective, such as the management of economic risk, from government to individual 
families.”). 
 57 Eichner, supra note 40, at 218. 
 58 Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26–28 (1974) (describing a theory of 
the “minimal . . . and ultraminimal state”) (emphasis omitted). 
 59 Grewal & Purdy, supra note 25, at 8. 
 60 BROWN, supra note 28, at 42. 
 61 Id. 
 62 COSSMAN, supra note 56, at 15. 
 63 Alstott, supra note 10, at 25. 
 64 Id. at 25–26; see also id. at 32 (“The state’s implicit role is to facilitate market transactions 
by protecting property rights. Beyond that, the state need not take any particular actions to pro-
mote family life, protect children, or mitigate the poverty, distress, and isolation produced by free 
markets.”). 
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tion” of ways to “promote a family life open to all,” including by collective-
ly supplying “the resources that make family life possible.”65 
Others join Alstott in describing the modern approach to privatizing 
dependency as “neoliberal” and criticizing the limits it imposes on family 
law. Laura Rosenbury argues that “the underlying rationale for legal recog-
nition of family in the neoliberal state” is “encouraging the private support 
of dependency,” and that pursuing this goal precludes the state from ade-
quately recognizing other values, including “pluralism,” “dignity,” and 
“equality,” which also “help . . . families flourish.”66 Deborah Dinner de-
scribes late-twentieth century developments in divorce and welfare law as 
entrenching the neoliberal requirement to privatize support and thereby “re-
inforc[ing] gender and class inequalities.”67 Susan Appleton describes how 
“a neoliberal gloss” transformed Eisenstadt v. Baird’s potentially radical 
promise of privacy into the modern “principle of ‘privatization’ of depend-
ency” and “‘personal responsibility,’” again with gender- and class-based 
consequences.68 Angela Harris similarly observes that neoliberalism’s natu-
ralization of “economic relations” “conceal[s] subordination and natural-
ize[s] inequality,”69 while Angela Onwuachi-Willig exposes how “attempts 
to make all people into self-sufficient citizens” cast “families that do not fit 
the traditional white family model as deviant” and preserves “the hierar-
chical race-based organization of American society.”70 And Maxine Eichner 
argues that the neoliberal state’s failure to “protect[] families from market 
forces” undermines family life for market winners and losers alike.71 These 
scholars condemn the way in which modern family law instrumentalizes the 
family and its resulting blindness to other roles that families could, and 
should, play in promoting their members’ well-being.72 
Scholars have also recognized that the law’s focus on privatizing de-
pendency undermines autonomy. Susan Appleton notes that “family law[] 
embrace[s] . . . contradictory objectives,” with “the protection of autonomy, 
liberty, and personal choice, on one hand, and the ongoing regulation of 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Id. at 25–26. 
 66 Rosenbury, supra note 18, at 1869–70. 
 67 Dinner, supra note 29, at 83; see also id. at 84. 
 68 Appleton, Forgotten Family Law, supra note 19, at 27–28, 41 (discussing Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)). 
 69 Harris, supra note 26, at 1543, 1564. 
 70 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 47, at 1694. 
 71 Maxine Eichner, The Family, in Context, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1980, 2011 (2015). 
 72 See Alstott, supra note 10, at 25–26, 32; Appleton, Forgotten Family Law, supra note 19, 
at 27–28, 41; Dinner, supra note 29, at 83–84; Eichner, supra note 71, at 2011; Harris, supra note 
26, at 1543, 1564; Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 47, at 1694; Rosenbury, supra note 18, at 1869–
70. 
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intimate life,” often in the service of privatizing dependency, “on the oth-
er.”73 Anne Alstott observes that family law defies “individuals’ intentions” 
in the service of privatizing dependency, “us[ing] state power to impose 
lasting obligations on people who are affective or literal strangers, who be-
lieve themselves to have contracted around responsibility, or who are ac-
tively hostile to one another.”74 Laura Rosenbury similarly argues that “vi-
sions of family dependency and support . . . trump . . . individual intent.”75 
And Angela Onwuachi-Willig has criticized welfare law for enshrining “a 
narrow, patriarchal definition of family,” rather than “encompass[ing] and 
support[ing] a broad range of family forms that can give the poor agency in 
determining how to structure private support to help in escaping from pov-
erty.”76 But these scholars have focused on the public law context of the 
relationship between state and family—whether the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires the state to supply the resources necessary for meaningful family 
life; which kinds of childrearing arrangements should receive government 
support; and whether states or the federal government get to define family 
relationships.77 Scholars have yet to recognize how privatizing dependency 
also subverts an emergent conception of autonomy in the private law of 
family obligations, one that shares the modern private support imperative’s 
roots in neoliberalism. 
B. Autonomy as Property Rights 
Autonomy is an “essentially contested concept,” “the proper use of 
which inevitably involves endless disputes about [its] proper use[] on the 
part of [its] users.”78 Family law reflects autonomy’s variegated meanings, 
with legislatures, judges, litigants, and scholars agreeing on its importance 
but disagreeing about what it entails. Whereas constitutional law uses many 
rich concepts to describe the individual’s autonomy interest in protection 
from “unwarranted government intrusion” in his or her family life,79 mod-
ern family law understands autonomy to comprise an additional component: 
the right to choose one’s financial obligations to family members. Just as 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Appleton, Forgotten Family Law, supra note 19, at 41. 
 74 Alstott, supra note 19, at 3–4. 
 75 Rosenbury, supra note 18, at 1869. 
 76 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 47, at 1683, 1688. 
 77 Alstott, supra note 10, at 26; Susan Frelich Appleton, Obergefell’s Liberties: All in the 
Family, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 919, 922 (2016); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 47, at 1693; Rosenbury, 
supra note 18, at 1837. 
 78 W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167, 169 
(1956).  
 79 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
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neoliberalism understands freedom to consist in property holding and there-
fore to require the right to enjoy one’s property without interference, mod-
ern family law conceives of autonomy as the freedom to choose not just 
one’s intimate relationships, but also the property consequences of those 
relationships. Just as neoliberalism holds the alienation of property to be 
justified only with an owner’s consent, a rising strand within modern family 
law deems redistribution80 between intimates to be justified only if the rich-
er individual formally chose ex ante to take on family obligations. But this 
property-based vision of autonomy threatens to delegitimize the use of fam-
ily relationships to privatize dependency. 
“Autonomy” motivates and shapes the constitutional law of the fami-
ly.81 Although substantive due process jurisprudence does not comprehen-
sively define the interests implicated by state regulation of the family, cases 
articulate them in terms of individuals’ and families’ autonomy,82 liberty,83 
freedom,84 privacy,85 intimacy,86 and dignity.87 In addition to setting out this 
constellation of abstract values, constitutional law emphasizes autonomy’s 
function: State interference in questions of “marriage, procreation, contra-
ception, family relationships, child rearing, and education” is circumscribed 
because such “intimate choices” are “personal decisions” “central to . . . 
defin[ing] [one’s] identity.”88 As the Supreme Court explained in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, “[a]t the heart of liberty 
is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See supra note 22. 
 81 See Appleton, supra note 77, at 921. 
 82 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (deriving “the right to personal choice 
regarding marriage” from “the concept of individual autonomy”). 
 83 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (describing “an emerging awareness that 
liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives 
in matters pertaining to sex”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (pronounc-
ing “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under 
their control”). 
 84 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (recognizing Fourteenth 
Amendment protection for the “freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family 
life”). 
 85 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896 (1992) (describing the “private 
sphere of the family”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (describing the Constitution’s 
“guarantee of personal privacy”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (noting “the 
private realm of family life which the state cannot enter”). 
 86 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (describing marriage as “intimate to the 
degree of being sacred”). 
 87 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597. 
 88 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (“afford[ing] constitutional protection to personal decisions 
relating to” family matters); Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597. 
2018] The New Family Freedom 1999 
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under com-
pulsion of the State.”89 Similarly, “the importance of the familial relation-
ship . . . stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy 
of daily association, and from the role it plays in ‘promot[ing] a way of 
life.’”90 Such relationships also have wide-ranging and lasting consequenc-
es, shaping fundamentally the life courses of their members.91 The Constitu-
tion protects the “freedom of personal choice in matters of . . . family life” 
because our intimate lives could not otherwise fulfill their necessary role in 
our self-realization and self-determination.92 In this way, constitutional law 
reflects a comprehensive and capacious understanding of family autonomy 
as a requisite for human flourishing.93 
Respect for autonomy has liberalized family law across many dimen-
sions since the 1960s and 1970s. Although marriage used to be the only 
permissible form of sexual intimacy,94 respect for autonomy justified legal-
izing non-marital sexual activity95 and cohabitation,96 as well as lifting bans 
                                                                                                                           
 89 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
 90 Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (quoting 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231–33 (1972)). 
 91 See, e.g., Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 583 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing 
parenthood as “a lifelong relationship with significant financial, legal, and moral dimensions”). 
 92 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974); see Obergefell, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2599 (stating that “the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept 
of individual autonomy”); Smith, 431 U.S. at 845 (stating that “the liberty interest in family priva-
cy has its source, and its contours are ordinarily to be sought, . . . in intrinsic human rights”); cf. 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the 
right . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affect-
ing a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”). 
 93 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (describing the “the approach this Court has used in 
discussing . . . fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy,” as approaching those rights 
“in [their] comprehensive sense”); see also Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell 
v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 166 (2015) (describing Obergefell as “mov[ing] away from a 
jurisprudence of ‘unenumerated’ rights and toward a jurisprudence of interpreting the ‘enumerat-
ed’ right of liberty”). 
 94 Katherine Franke, The Curious Relationship of Marriage and Freedom, in MARRIAGE AT 
THE CROSSROADS: LAW, POLICY, AND THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY 
FAMILIES 87, 99 (Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott eds., 2012) [hereinafter Garrison & Scott, 
MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS] (“Marriage laws . . . include a set of expectations that are en-
forced through both civil and criminal laws.”); Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage 
and the Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 YALE L.J. 756, 761 (2006) (discussing “attempts to use marriage 
to locate and police the boundary between the categories of licit and illicit sex”); Murray, supra 
note 46, at 1 (describing marriage as “state-imposed sexual discipline”); Carl E. Schneider, The 
Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 496 (1992) (describing how “the 
law recruits, builds, shapes, sustains, and promotes social institutions”). 
 95 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 96 See, e.g., Illinois Public Act 86-490, 1986 Ill. Legis. Serv. 86-490 (West) (codified at 720 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-40 (West 2010)) (deleting “cohabits” from the criminal code); 
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 112 n.4 (Cal. 1976) (noting repeal of prohibition on “living ‘in a 
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on interracial and gay marriage.97 Autonomy also provided an important 
normative justification for the advent of no-fault divorce98 and the increased 
acceptance of private ordering within family law.99 As a result, adults have 
much more freedom to organize their intimate lives as they choose than 
they did one hundred years ago.100 
This increased intimate autonomy has also reshaped parent-child rela-
tionships. Adults’ relative freedom to pursue sexual relationships outside of 
marriage undermined illegitimacy regimes, as courts recognized the futility 
and unfairness of “attempt[ing] to influence the actions of men and women 
by imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate relation-
ships.”101 Autonomy also justifies constitutionally protecting access to birth 
control and abortion, which give women more control over whether and 
when they become mothers,102 as well as recognizing parent-child relation-
                                                                                                                           
state of cohabitation and adultery’”); see also Martha L. Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of 
Behavior: Sanctions on Non-Marital Cohabitation, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 275, 276–77 (“Criminal 
statutes punishing cohabitation were repealed in many states after . . . the Model Penal Code . . . 
criticized the use of the criminal law to punish . . . ‘moral violations.’”). 
 97 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 98 See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT §§ 302, 305, 9A U.L.A. 200, 242 (1998) 
(permitting judgment of divorce upon a finding that the marriage is “irretrievably broken”); see 
also Paul R. Amato, Institutional, Companionate, and Individualistic Marriages: Change over 
Time and Implications for Marital Quality, in Garrison & Scott, MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS, 
supra note 94, 107, 109–10 (describing the rise of “individualistic marriage,” in which “self-
development and personal fulfillment” form “the basis of marriage” and “unions are successful 
only to the extent that they continue to meet each partner’s innermost psychological needs”). 
 99 See Barbara A. Atwood, Marital Contracts and the Meaning of Marriage, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 
11, 17, 40–41 (2012); Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premari-
tal Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 172–73 
(1998); Brian H. Bix, Private Ordering and Family Law, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 249, 
251–52 (2010); Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinc-
tion, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 90 (2001); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering 
of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204, 280–86 (1982); Jana B. Sing-
er, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1445. 
 100 William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, 
Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1889 (2012) (“American family law in 
the last century has moved away from a monopolistic regime where marriage . . . was the only 
item on the menu, and it has moved toward a pluralist regime where each state offers a larger 
menu of options for romantic couples . . . .”); see also Erez Aloni, The Puzzle of Family Law Plu-
ralism, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 317, 318 (2016) (stating that “family law is moving toward 
developing a menu of options for legal recognition of relationships” with “greater room for variety 
and choice within each regime”). 
 101 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977). But cf. Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate 
Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 346–
50 (2011) (arguing that nonmarital children still suffer discrimination). 
 102 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
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ships based on intent in the context of assisted reproductive technology and 
social parenthood.103 
In light of the law’s increasing acceptance of autonomy in family mat-
ters and the accompanying increasing diversity of family forms, many 
scholars advocate for pluralist family law regimes “that . . . allow[] individ-
uals to pursue their own vision of the good life in forming family relation-
ships.”104 Under a pluralist regime, the state’s proper role is to respect indi-
viduals’ self-defining choices about intimate relationships by recognizing 
and supporting equally their different family organizations.105 
                                                                                                                           
 103 Cf. Melanie B. Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Parentage Principles to Nonlegal Lesbian 
Coparents, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 433, 448 (2005) (arguing that courts should use intent to estab-
lish legal parenthood for lesbian co-parents); Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 
YALE L.J. 2260, 2269 (2017) (arguing that family law should “ground[] [parental] recognition . . . 
in social contributions to parenting”); Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted 
Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 642 (2002) 
(describing how autonomy-based theories support assigning parentage based on intent). 
 104 Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration and the 
Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 297 (2015). 
 105 Id. (stating that “fundamental notions of autonomy and fairness support the [pluralists’] 
claim that the liberal state should offer individuals the freedom to undertake whatever family rela-
tionships maximize their utility and then should support those families equally”); see also MAR-
THA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTI-
ETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 226–36 (1995) (arguing for abolition of marriage and organizing family 
and dependency around caretaker relationships); NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND 
GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 46–62 (2008) (arguing that mar-
riage’s privileged position harms non-marital families); Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 64–66 (2012) (arguing that legal benefits currently attached to marriage should 
be disaggregated and redistributed either directly to individuals or based on other, non-marital 
relationships); David L. Chambers, The “Legalization” of the Family: Toward a Policy of Sup-
portive Neutrality, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 805, 813–18 (1985) (arguing that government should 
regulate families according to a principle of “supportive neutrality”); Eskridge, supra note 100, at 
1900 (stating that “the normative baseline of American family law has moved . . . toward . . . of-
fering romantic couples more choices”); Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2685, 2686 (2008) (arguing that “efforts to secure marriage equality for same-sex couples 
must be undertaken . . . in a way that is compatible with efforts to dislodge marriage from its nor-
matively superior status as compared with other forms of human attachment, commitment, and 
desire”); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Marriage as Monopoly: History, Tradition, Incrementalism, and 
the Marriage/Civil Union Distinction, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1397, 1401 (2009) (arguing that the state 
is complicit in causing “the lesser social value of civil unions vis-a-vis marriage”); Kaiponanea T. 
Matsumura, Public Policing of Intimate Agreements, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 159, 200 (2013) 
(arguing that “inhibit[ing] the development of novel family structures and interpersonal duties 
. . . . lessens . . . individual freedom”); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 47, at 1693 (suggesting that 
the state support “custodial cohorts” and “parenting partnerships”); Alice Ristroph & Melissa 
Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236, 1240 (2010) (“explor[ing] . . . how a 
principle of familial nonestablishment could ensure familial and individual freedom”); Laura A. 
Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 193 (2007) (arguing that family law 
recognition of non-sexual adult intimate relationships could “reinvent[] individuals’ options with 
respect to both marriage and friendship”); Edward Stein, Looking Beyond Full Relationship 
Recognition for Couples Regardless of Sex: Abolition, Alternatives, and/or Functionalism, 28 
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But the diversity of modern intimate associations poses challenges, not 
only for proper distribution of public family benefits but also for proper 
assignment of private family responsibilities. In the law of family obliga-
tions, litigants increasingly urge a vision of autonomy that understands the 
concept also to comprise the freedom to choose one’s family obligations.106 
Whereas under family law pluralism, respecting “choice” involves equality 
of state recognition and support for desired family commitments,107 the new 
family freedom appeals to “choice” to argue that private-law family obliga-
tions are illegitimate unless formally assented to ex ante.108 
Choice-based arguments start from the underlying premise that the 
ability to control private property is essential to an individual’s freedom.109 
Because freedom depends on controlling property, it “would be seriously 
impeded, and possibly destroyed, if legitimate rights holders who have not 
acted in a tortious manner could be deprived of their rights by force of law 
without their consent.”110 For this reason, alienation of property is deemed 
illegitimate unless accompanied by the rights holder’s consent.111 
The new family freedom transports this logic into the intimate sphere 
by insisting that only ceremonial marriage—through which an individual 
undertakes enumerated duties to a spouse and any resulting children—and 
formal contract demonstrate the requisite consent to family obligation. 
Without contemporaneous formalities to mark ex ante consent, redistribu-
tion of resources between individuals whose relationship appears family-
like ex post is deemed illegitimate.112 Functioning similarly to nineteenth 
century subjective theories of contract, choice about obligations insists upon 
financial freedom from functional-but-not-formal family members. 
                                                                                                                           
LAW & INEQ. 345, 349 (2010) (arguing for a “functionalist approach to relationship recognition” 
combined with “a ‘menu’ of alternatives to marriage”). But cf. Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recogni-
tion, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1276, 1278–85 (2014) (arguing that state recognition of relationships can 
harm unmarried partners). 
 106 See infra notes 125–310 and accompanying text (Part II). 
 107 Cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. 
Scott, Marriage as a Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1232 (1998) (“A legal regime that 
constrains the freedom to commit actually limits individual freedom.”). 
 108 For discussions of the relationship between choice and consent, see generally Barnett, supra 
note 30, and Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Choosing Marriage, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1999 (2017). 
 109 See NOZICK, supra note 58, at 163–64. 
 110 Barnett, supra note 30, at 297–98. 
 111 Id. at 299 (“[T]he consent of the rights holder to be legally obligated is the moral compo-
nent that distinguishes valid from invalid transfers of alienable rights in a system of entitle-
ments.”). 
 112 Cf. Eskridge, supra note 100, at 1885–86 (describing the libertarian “belie[f] that the op-
timal goal of family law is to enforce the relationship preferences of mature adults, without gov-
ernmental meddling”). 
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Insofar as this account of autonomy revolves around individuals’ rights 
to control their property, even vis-à-vis family members, it sounds in ne-
oliberalism. Choice about obligations echoes the “possessive individualism” 
that C.B. Macpherson identified in the seventeenth century political and 
economic theories upon which neoliberalism builds:113 
The individual, it was thought, is free inasmuch as he is proprie-
tor of his person and capacities. The human essence is freedom 
from dependence on the wills of others, and freedom is a function 
of possession. Society becomes a lot of free equal individuals re-
lated to each other as proprietors of their own capacities and of 
what they have acquired by their exercise.114 
This critique is overstated as applied to classical liberalism, which did dis-
tinguish “among the criteria for individual moral, associational, and eco-
nomic actions.”115 The new family freedom, on the other hand, does con-
struct the individual “as an owner of himself,” rather than “as part of a larg-
er social whole.”116 For insisting upon ex ante consent to family obligation 
casts intimates as linked through formal exchange, rather than united in 
community. In this way, choice about obligations applies a market-based, 
contractual idea of freedom, pervasive in neoliberal rhetoric, to family rela-
tions. 
 Choice about obligations also finds consonance with Henry Maine’s 
famous status-to-contract hypothesis: “[F]rom a condition of society in 
which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, 
we . . . have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in which all 
these relations arise from the free agreement of Individuals.”117 By requir-
ing even family relations and accompanying obligations to arise out of ex-
                                                                                                                           
 113 C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO 
LOCKE (Wynford ed. 2011); see Grewal & Purdy, supra note 25, at 1. 
 114 MACPHERSON, supra note 113, at 3. 
 115 BROWN, supra note 28, at 42. 
 116 MACPHERSON, supra note 113, at 3. 
 117 HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 169 (10th ed. 1885) (1861); see also Vivian Ham-
ilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 47 (2006) (“The conventional 
wisdom is that the progress of U.S. family law has been a steady march ‘from status to contract’ or 
from public to private ordering.”); Carl E. Schenider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of 
American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1808–09 (1985) (describing family law’s shift 
toward contract); Singer, supra note 99, at 1444–46 (describing family law’s shift toward con-
tract). But see Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM 
OF CONTRACT 256, 256 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) (“[W]e are far from a system in which parties 
are free to contract for any marital arrangement they want . . . .”); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon 
of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 834–48 (2004) (arguing that the status-to-contract hypothe-
sis is overstated in family law). 
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plicit agreement, choice logic understands intimates to operate within a 
post-status, assent-based world. 
Strands of choice logic are evident in both law and legal scholarship. 
Private ordering has established itself within family law via the increasing 
acceptance of pre- and post-nuptial agreements, through which spouses 
have greater freedom to “themselves determine their postdissolution rights 
and responsibilities.”118 Elizabeth Scott and Robert Scott have explored hy-
pothetical bargaining between spouses in order to outline the contours of an 
ideal marital property regime.119 Scholars have even adapted the language 
of consent to other purposes, justifying wide-ranging marital obligations in 
terms of consent to marital status.120 
Arguments against imposing family relationships without an individu-
al’s consent also employ choice reasoning and carry increasing weight. 
Scholars have argued that the Constitution requires consent to marital and 
parental relationships,121 and similar autonomy concerns have influenced 
contract disputes. In a case regarding the disposition of pre-embryos, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts announced “a public policy . . . 
                                                                                                                           
 118 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case 
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979); see Alstott, supra note 10, at 32–38 (describing how 
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 120 See Katherine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law 
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240–41 (“The marital vows . . . represent explicit and implicit promises by each spouse to accept a 
set of responsibilities that will assure that the other’s dependency needs are met.”); Gregg Strauss, 
The Positive Right to Marry, 102 VA. L. REV. 1691, 1751–52 (2016) (describing the marriage 
ceremony as “a central moment of marriage’s basic structure” and “a performative speech act” 
through which “spouses exercise their power to create the [marriage] relationship and its accom-
panying duties”). 
 121 For arguments about marriage, see Matsumura, supra note 108, at 2042 & n.269, and 
Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, A Right Not to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1509, 1544–56 (2016). 
For arguments about parenthood, see Matsumura, supra note 105, at 176 (noting that Griswold, 
Eisenstadt, and Roe could support “a right to procreational autonomy that could protect a person’s 
decision to reconsider becoming a genetic parent even over his or her prior commitments to the 
contrary”), and I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115 
(2008). 
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that individuals shall not be compelled to enter into intimate family rela-
tionships, and that the law shall not be used as a mechanism for forcing 
such relationships when they are not desired.”122 The court described this 
policy as “grounded in the notion that respect for liberty and privacy re-
quires that individuals be accorded the freedom to decide whether to enter 
into a family relationship.”123 The court’s refusal to “compel an individual 
to become a parent over his or her contemporaneous objection” reflected 
choice-based reasoning, namely that only appropriately timed formal con-
sent can legitimate family obligations.124 
Under choice about obligation, only ceremonial marriage and written 
contracts provide the appropriate basis to impose financial obligations upon 
family members. But in the absence of these family formalities, the new 
family freedom’s property-based conception of autonomy conflicts funda-
mentally with the private support imperative. As Part II will show, the ten-
sion between the two principles contributes to some of the most perplexing 
doctrinal problems in the law of family obligations. 
II. AUTONOMY AGAINST DEPENDENCY 
Scholars have debated the proper content of the laws of parentage, co-
habitant obligations, and alimony since the 1970s, when marriage’s monop-
oly on family life began to erode and the welfare state began to contract. 
Despite extensive attention, however, these three areas—which together 
constitute the law of family obligations—remain marked by doctrinal con-
tradiction and normative confusion. 
The incoherence arises from the insoluble tension between choice 
about obligations and privatizing dependency. Forced to choose between 
principles, and against the backdrop of a minimalist state, family law opts 
fundamentally to privatize dependency. This resolution is unsurprising, as 
privatizing dependency has always been a foundational pillar of family 
law.125 But because of the new family freedom’s rhetorical force, this result 
is more functionally achieved than openly avowed. Because parentage law 
deals with children’s inevitable dependency, it often nakedly defies the new 
family freedom by instituting the private support imperative over parents’ 
                                                                                                                           
 122 A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000); see also J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 
719 (N.J. 2001) (permitting “either party [to a preembryo agreement] to change his or her mind 
about disposition up to the point of use or destruction of any stored preembryos”). 
 123 A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1059. 
 124 Id.; see Appleton, Between the Binaries, supra note 19, at 113 (stating that “the rhetoric of 
constitutional autonomy and choice in family matters” supported the Supreme Judicial Court’s 
“policy of requiring contemporaneous consent for the formation of a new family relationship”). 
 125 See supra notes 36–77 and accompanying text (Part I.A). 
2006 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1983 
choice-based claims. But rather than admit that lack of support for social 
reproduction limits family members’ financial freedom, the law papers over 
the problem by equating the fact of sexual activity with consent to parental 
obligation.126 Because the laws of cohabitant obligations and alimony in-
volve adults, they can appear to vindicate the new family freedom. Under 
the auspices of respecting autonomy, courts and legislatures cast intimates 
as having “assumed the risk” of limited or non-existent family-based obli-
gation by virtue of their choices over the course of a relationship—
effectively requiring each party to privatize her own dependency.127 Yet the 
law’s expectation that all adults leave their relationships self-sufficient not 
only fails to reflect the realities of intimate relationships, but also turns a 
blind eye to the difficulties many adults face in surviving on their own mar-
ket efforts under our current system. Thus, despite attempts to reconcile the 
new family freedom with privatized dependency through legal fictions, doc-
trinal work-arounds, and willful ignorance, the tension between the two 
principles remains unresolved. 
A. Parentage: Openly Privatizing Dependency 
When the private support imperative conflicts with choice about obli-
gations in the context of parental obligations, the law makes a clear elec-
tion: to privatize children’s dependency. This priority not only drives pater-
nity law, which makes biological fathers strictly liable for child support, but 
also underlies doctrines that adopt intent-based approaches to parentage 
only insofar as adults seek to establish (rather than avoid) obligations. Al-
though the urgency of children’s developmental needs provides good reason 
to limit adults’ autonomy, it is difficult to articulate this rationale in terms 
consistent with the new family freedom. As a result, parentage law appears 
schismatic, adopting the language of choice when intent aligns with creat-
ing obligations and locating choice in sex or denying its importance alto-
gether when adults seek to avoid parenthood. This split focuses the state’s 
most coercive efforts to privatize dependency on precisely those parents 
least able to financially support their children, with unfortunate results for 
all concerned. Parentage law’s approach to obligation also casts raising 
children as a choice the costs of which individuals must internalize, rather 
than a socially valuable endeavor for which the collective might bear some 
responsibility. 
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1. Strict Liability for Sex 
Nowhere is family law’s focus on privatizing dependency more appar-
ent than in the law of paternity establishment for purposes of child support. 
Although constitutionally protected access to birth control and abortion has 
attenuated the connection between sex and parenthood for women,128 the 
law holds men strictly liable for financial support when their sexual activity 
results in the birth of a child.129 The private support imperative is so strong 
that the law establishes paternity even in victims of rape or fraud and metes 
out harsh punishments to men who are unable to meet state standards of 
financial provision.130 
Although it is just that men should share financial responsibility for the 
children they sire, modern family law pursues this end in a historically spe-
cific and coercive way. Whereas legal fatherhood originally “existed almost 
exclusively within marriage,” U.S. law has evolved to encompass “non-
marital fathers . . . primarily in order to obtain monetary support for chil-
dren.”131 Under early Roman and medieval continental law, a child born 
outside of marriage was filius nullius, a child of no one.132 The British Poor 
Laws passed in 1576 permitted parishes to recoup from biological fathers 
the cost of supporting non-marital children on public aid.133 Similarly, U.S. 
non-marital fathers were generally “liberated from legal obligations” prior 
to the mid-twentieth century, “except to the extent the state could call upon 
them to support children who otherwise would depend on public assis-
tance.”134 But rising divorce rates and the welfare state retrenchment of the 
1970s made this state of affairs untenable.135 In response, an “increasingly 
                                                                                                                           
 128 Of course, many women lack effective access to birth control and abortion. See Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326–27 (1980); see also, e.g., Yvonne Lindgren, The Rhetoric of Choice: 
Restoring Healthcare to the Abortion Right, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 388, 390 (2013) (arguing that 
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 129 See Appleton, Between the Binaries, supra note 19, at 105 (describing “background prin-
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 135 Baker, supra note 11, at 328–29. 
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coercive federal-state legal apparatus” has developed to “impose[] child 
support obligations on divorced and never-married fathers.”136 The modern 
strict-liability approach to paternity is thus firmly rooted in the present ne-
oliberal moment. 
Current paternity doctrine is structured by federal law, which requires 
states to “operate . . . child support enforcement program[s] that conform[] 
with” federal statutory and regulatory requirements in order to receive fed-
eral welfare funds.137 These federal standards require states to “establish a 
comprehensive system to establish paternity, locate absent parents, . . . help 
families obtain support orders,” and “collect overdue support payments.”138 
Although federal law encourages men to acknowledge paternity voluntarily, 
it also mandates that states adopt a “presumption of paternity upon genetic 
testing results indicating a threshold probability that the alleged father is the 
father of the child.”139 Federal welfare law thus nationalizes a policy of es-
tablishing paternity in biological fathers. Taken as a whole, the modern pa-
ternity regime casts sexual intercourse as an inherently dangerous activity, 
with partners declared to have assumed the risk of procreation in order to 
privatize the dependency of any resulting children.140 
Men have challenged the current regime on substantive constitutional 
grounds, to no avail. The New York Court of Appeals has declared that a 
man’s “constitutional entitlement to avoid procreation does not encompass a 
                                                                                                                           
 136 Dinner, supra note 29, at 86. 
 137 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 333 (1997). See generally Child Support Performance 
and Incentive Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–200, 112 Stat. 645; Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act 
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for a genetic father to be simply a donor with no parental rights or obligations”); Baker, supra note 
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contribution.”); cf. Shari Motro, The Price of Pleasure, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 917, 949, 972, 977 
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right to avoid a child support obligation.”141 More recently, the Sixth Circuit 
rejected the argument that child support laws violate equal protection by 
“denying men, but not women, ‘the right to initiate consensual sexual activ-
ity while choosing to not be a parent.’”142 Citing the state’s “important in-
terest in providing for . . . support” of a child “already in existence,” the 
court denied that “any parent, male or female,” has “a fundamental right . . . 
to sever his or her financial responsibilities to [a] child after the child is 
born.”143 As the court had earlier explained, “[f]or reasons of child welfare 
and social utility, if not for moral reasons, the biological relationship be-
tween a father and his offspring . . . remains constitutionally sufficient to 
support . . . child support requirements.”144 Because men cannot “opt out of 
fatherhood,”145 “[r]eproduction and child support requirements occur with-
out regard to the male’s wishes.”146 In the context of child support, the Con-
stitution does not recognize the new family freedom; instead, once a child is 
conceived, her father’s autonomy interests come second to meeting her ma-
terial needs. 
Procedural due process challenges have been similarly unsuccessful. 
The Supreme Court has concluded that, even though clear and convincing 
evidence is required to terminate a parental relationship,147 establishing pa-
ternity by a preponderance of the evidence passes constitutional muster.148 
Despite Justice Brennan’s dissenting observation that parenthood is “a life-
long relationship with significant financial, legal, and moral dimensions,” 
the majority reasoned that a “putative father has no legitimate right and cer-
tainly no liberty interest in avoiding financial obligations to his natural child 
that are validly imposed by state law.”149 The Court’s asymmetrical treat-
ment of error risk vis-à-vis parental relationships has the practical effect of 
funneling adults into, while impeding their exit from, parental obligations—
a useful flow pattern for encouraging maximal private provision for chil-
dren’s dependency needs.150 
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Courts’ uniform rejection of tort-based “birth control fraud” claims 
further demonstrates the strict-liability logic of paternity law. In these cases, 
men challenge child support orders or seek monetary awards on the ground 
that their lovers misled them about the potential reproductive consequences 
of sexual conduct.151 Despite the women’s allegedly tortious actions, courts 
show no compunction in holding men to child support obligations.152 In 
Wallis v. Smith, for example, the New Mexico Court of Appeals relied upon 
“the public policy that governs the economic consequences of sexual rela-
tionships that produce children” to reject the father’s contraceptive fraud 
claim.153 The court described New Mexico’s child support guidelines as 
“impos[ing] a form of strict liability for child support, without regard to 
which parent bears the greater responsibility for the child’s being.”154 Insist-
ing explicitly on “personal responsibility in sexual relationships,” the Wallis 
court refused to “allow[] a parent to opt out of the financial consequences of 
his or her sexual relationships just because they were unintended.”155 The 
court defended its decision not only on the ground that its position “makes 
paramount the interests of the child,” but also because it “has the added 
benefit of insulating the state from the possibility of bearing the financial 
burden for a child.”156 By assigning to adults the risk of support obligations 
if a child results from their sexual activities, these cases make manifest the 
underlying purpose of modern paternity law: privatizing children’s depend-
ency. 
The law’s strict-liability logic is so strong that paternity attaches even 
when a man’s sexual conduct was in some sense involuntary. At least ten 
states have held that male victims of statutory rape are liable for child sup-
                                                                                                                           
 151 Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 684 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (citing cases and stating that “no 
jurisdiction recognizes contraceptive fraud or breach of promise to practice birth control as a 
ground for adjusting a natural parent’s obligation to pay child support”); see also Stephen K. v. 
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port.157 These courts “uniformly conclude[] [that] legal consent under crim-
inal law is irrelevant in a civil action for support of the child born of a mi-
nor father and an adult mother.”158 They explain that, although a boy’s 
“youth is basic to the crime” of statutory rape, “it is not a factor in the ques-
tion of whether he is the father” of a resulting child and thus liable for its 
support.159 
One could understand this rule as anti-opportunistic, with courts refus-
ing to allow adolescents’ age to excuse them from the predictable conse-
quences of otherwise consensual sexual conduct. The California Court of 
Appeals reasoned that “[o]ne who is injured as a result of criminal conduct 
in which he willingly participated is not a typical crime victim.”160 The 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals went further, declaring that “[i]f voluntary in-
tercourse results in parenthood, then for purposes of child support, the 
parenthood is voluntary . . . . even if [it] resulted from a sexual assault . . . 
within the meaning of the criminal law.”161 Not only did the Wisconsin 
court deem the teenager before it to have consented to sexual conduct with 
an adult, it considered his consent also to encompass his resulting father-
hood and justify its concomitant support obligations. 
But anti-opportunism cannot explain imposing child support obliga-
tions on men who did not knowingly or voluntarily engage in sexual inter-
course.162 In S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., an Alabama appellate court affirmed a 
child support order against a man who was unconscious during the child’s 
conception.163 Although the evidence at trial suggested that the mother had 
committed forcible sexual assault, the appeals court insisted that “any 
wrongful conduct on the part of the mother should not alter the father’s duty 
to provide support for the child.”164 In State v. Frisard, a Louisiana appellate 
court upheld a paternity finding even though the man insisted his sexual 
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consin); see also Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Bennett v. Miller, 688 So. 2d 1024, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1997) (surveying cases). 
 158 In re Paternity of K.B., 104 P.3d at 1134. 
 159 Schierenbeck v. Minor, 367 P.2d 333, 335 (Colo. 1961). 
 160 Cnty. of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 844 (Ct. App. 1996); see 
also Paternity of K.B., 104 P.3d at 1133 (characterizing “the purported victim” as “a willing par-
ticipant in the sexual misconduct”); Schierenbeck, 367 P.2d at 335 (noting the father’s “assent to 
the illicit act”). 
 161 In re Paternity of J.L.H., 441 N.W.2d 273, 276–78 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989). 
 162 Cf. Michael J. Higdon, Fatherhood by Conscription: Nonconsensual Insemination and the 
Duty of Child Support, 46 GA. L. REV. 407, 413 (2012) (arguing for a consent-based “affirmative 
defense to child support obligations for those fathers whose parenthood arose as a result of sexual 
assault”). 
 163 S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). 
 164 Id. 
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contact with the mother was limited to oral sex.165 And although in Phillips 
v. Irons an Illinois appellate court reinstated a suit alleging facts similar to 
Frisard’s, the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim did not di-
rectly challenge the father’s paternity or his obligation to support the result-
ing child.166 That even physically involuntary or (typically) non-procreative 
sexual contact can ground support obligations shows just how strongly the 
imperative to privatize children’s dependency shapes this area of law. 
Scholars almost universally criticize paternity law’s current approach.167 
They argue that the current child support system neither fulfills the state’s 
goal of meeting children’s financial needs nor recognizes the material ways 
in which low-income fathers do contribute to their children’s develop-
ment.168 Instead, punitive child support collection efforts, including “wage 
garnishment, suspension of drivers or professional licenses, or jail,” inhibit 
fathers’ ability to earn income and drive them away from their children.169 
Scholars point out rightly that imposing strict paternal liability for sexual 
conception does little to satisfy, and may even obstruct, a child’s need for a 
stable parent.170 They also question whether it is just for men to have less 
                                                                                                                           
 165 694 So. 2d 1032, 1035–36 (La. Ct. App. 1997). 
 166 No. 1–03–2992, 2005 WL 4694579, at *2–5 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 22, 2005). 
 167 But see NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 115–19 (2000); Nancy D. Polikoff, 
The Deliberate Construction of Families Without Fathers: Is It an Option for Lesbian and Hetero-
sexual Mothers?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 375, 375–76 (1996). 
 168 See, e.g., Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy Toward 
Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 617, 633 
(2012); Dowd, supra note 131, at 140 (“Even if all fathers were identified and all child support as 
currently structured were paid, we would not eliminate a substantial proportion of child pov-
erty.”); Leslie Joan Harris, Questioning Child Support Enforcement Policy for Poor Families, 45 
FAM. L.Q. 157, 169–72 (2011); Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining Child 
Support for Poor Fathers, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 1000–08 (2006); Onwuachi-Willig, supra 
note 47, at 1684–85 (describing the welfare system’s historical failure to “value unemployed fa-
thers’ non-monetary contributions to their families”). 
 169 Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422, 428 (6th Cir. 2007); see also CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAIL-
URE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 104 (2014) (describing the 
current child support enforcement regime as “a vicious cycle, where fathers who are behind in 
their child-support payments face sanctions that virtually ensure that they will fall even farther be-
hind”); Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: The Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of Parental 
Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299, 357 (2002) (describing how intrusively the child support system polices 
non-intact families); Noah D. Zatz, A New Peonage?: Pay, Work, or Go to Jail in Contemporary 
Child Support Enforcement and Beyond, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 927, 933–35 (2016). 
 170 Appleton, Between the Binaries, supra note 19, at 111 (stating that “the particular means 
of conception has no inherent connection to a child’s affective ties”); Baker, supra note 120, at 21 
(stating that “a reluctant father . . . is unlikely to assume a meaningful role as father”); Dowd, 
supra note 131, at 135 (“While financial responsibility serves our social, adult needs, what matters 
most to children is emotional relationships and caregiving.”). 
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choice about incurring parental obligations than women do.171 For all of 
these reasons, many scholars advocate basing parentage upon intent to par-
ent, rather than “sex or genes.”172 
But proposed reforms, which invariably call for greater state financial 
support for children, reflect the same pervading conflict between neoliberal 
commitments.173 For re-centering paternity law around chosen parental rela-
tionships would require relaxing the current insistence on privatizing chil-
dren’s dependency. But because our society is unwilling to take on much 
collective responsibility for meeting children’s needs, legislatures and 
courts continue to equate the choice to have sex with the choice to become a 
parent, and to punish low-income fathers who are unable to provide finan-
cially for their children. 
2. Choice as a One-Way Ratchet 
Paternity law’s strict-liability approach seems especially unjust be-
cause family law appears to adopt an intent-based approach to parentage in 
cases involving assisted reproductive technology and social parenthood.174 
Katherine Baker, for instance, argues that contract principles “currently 
govern[] the law of paternity in almost all cases involving non-traditional 
means of conception and . . . increasingly . . . govern[] the law of paternity 
in most cases involving men who have acted like fathers toward a child.”175 
                                                                                                                           
 171 Baker, supra note 120, at 19. See generally Melanie B. Jacobs, Parental Parity: Intention-
al Parenthood’s Promise, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 465 (2016) (arguing that parenthood should be as-
signed based on intention in order to achieve equality between parents, whether same-sex or het-
erosexual, men or women, rich or poor); Melanie G. McCulley, The Male Abortion: The Putative 
Father’s Right to Terminate His Interests in and Obligations to the Unborn Child, 7 J.L. & POL’Y 
1, 1 n.*, 7–8 (1998) (explaining the “purpose” of “demonstrat[ing] the inequities involved in the 
abortion decision,” and arguing “that a putative father should have the same right to escape [fami-
ly] responsibilities as . . . an unwed mother”); Christopher Bruno, Note, A Right to Decide Not to 
Be a Legal Father: Gonzales v. Carhart and the Acceptance of Emotional Harm as a Constitution-
ally Protected Interest, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 141, 143 (2008) (arguing for “a privacy right to 
decide not to be a legal father”). 
 172 Baker, supra note 120, at 2; see also Dowd, supra note 131, at 134 (“Genes should not 
define fatherhood. . . . [F]atherhood should be defined by . . . acts of nurturing.”). 
 173 See Baker, supra note 120, at 20; Stacy Brustin, Child Support: Shifting the Financial 
Burden in Low-Income Families, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 4–5 (2012) (summarizing 
reform proposals); Dowd, supra note 131, at 135, 138; Jacobs, supra note 171, at 468–69 (propos-
ing to abolish federal Title IV–D law and permit some children to have a legal mother only). 
 174 Appleton, Between the Binaries, supra note 19, at 94–95 (“[A]s techniques of assisted 
reproduction became more sophisticated and arrangements more complex, . . . . [t]he parties’ in-
tent when undertaking the reproductive arrangement emerged as a pivotal criterion.”) (citing Mar-
jorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity 
for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297). 
 175 Baker, supra note 120, at 22. 
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But although the law considers parental intent in the context of assisted re-
production, surrogacy, same-sex and step-parenting, it does so only to the 
extent that an adult takes on responsibility for a child, i.e., only insofar as 
choice about parental obligations dovetails with privatizing dependency. 
Despite parentage law’s autonomy rhetoric, choice about parenthood re-
mains, at best, a one-way ratchet. 
Voluntary paternity affidavits provide a prime example of parentage 
law’s unidirectional recognition of choice. As part of the federal paternity 
establishment scheme, states must establish procedures by which mothers and 
putative fathers, given oral and written notice of the legal consequences, may 
voluntarily acknowledge a man’s paternity by joint affidavit.176 Unless re-
scinded within sixty days or challenged thereafter on grounds of fraud, du-
ress, or material mistake of fact, these paternity affidavits become equivalent 
to judicial determinations that are owed full faith and credit.177 These 
“[v]oluntary acknowledgments have become the most common way to estab-
lish the legal paternity of children born outside marriage.”178 But this scheme 
permits choice about parental obligations only insofar as it furthers the law’s 
efforts to privatize children’s dependency: Whereas a non-biological father 
may execute a voluntary paternity affidavit, a biological father cannot dis-
claim paternity unless another adult stands ready to fulfill the parental role.179 
Voluntary paternity affidavits thus recognize parental intent only insofar as 
doing so creates the family ties that privatize dependency.  
The Uniform Parentage Act (or UPA), versions of which have been 
adopted by twenty-one states, similarly focuses on choice about entry into 
the parent-child relationship.180 To effectuate “the principle that . . . all chil-
                                                                                                                           
 176 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5) (2012). 
 177 Id.; see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, art. 3, prefatory cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000, 
amended 2002) (stating that the UPA, too, “contains clear and comprehensive procedures” for 
voluntary acknowledgement of paternity). 
 178 Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage for Same-Sex Couples, 20 
AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 467, 469–70 (2012). 
 179 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 303.5(g) (2012) (no federal requirement that voluntary paternity 
affidavit recite man’s biological paternity); Chris Worden, Rethinking the Paternity Affidavit, 52 
RES GESTAE 14, 14 (2009) (suggesting that voluntary paternity affidavits increase the likelihood 
that non-genetically related men will become legal fathers); cf. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 
110, 110–11 (1989) (refusing to allow biological father to challenge marital presumption does not 
violate due process); supra notes 128–173 (Part II.A.1). 
 180 As of December 2000, nineteen states had enacted the 1973 UPA. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000, amended 2002), prefatory note; see also Legislative Fact Sheet—
Parentage Act (1973), UNIF. LAW COMM’N (Apr. 13, 2018), http://www.uniformlaws.org/
LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act%20(1973) [https://perma.cc/W9RZ-6KDU] (list-
ing enactments by Alabama, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, 
New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington). Eleven states have en-
acted the 2002 UPA. Legislative Fact Sheet—Parentage Act (2002), UNIF. LAW COMM’N (Apr. 
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dren and all parents [should] have equal rights with respect to each other,” 
the UPA creates a scheme of presumptions and procedures for establishing a 
child’s parentage at birth or soon after.181 The 2002 UPA contains some pro-
visions governing parentage of children born from assisted reproduction,182 
and the 2017 revision was undertaken specifically “to ensure the equal 
treatment of children born to same-sex couples.”183 In both contexts, the 
2017 UPA now establishes parentage based not on adults’ genetic relation-
ships to children, but on their intent to parent. 
This intent-based approach seems to conflict with the same Model 
Act’s Articles on establishing paternity in genetic fathers, until we realize 
that both sets of provisions serve to privatize dependency. Though conform-
ity with federal law could explain the Model Act’s apparent bifurcation,184 
the UPA’s overarching goal of treating all children equally provides a more 
profound unifying explanation. For achieving equality between children 
requires providing all children with at least two parents, and thus the UPA’s 
emphasis is on establishing parent-child relationships. The UPA therefore 
contains many paths in addition to genetics through which an adult may 
become a parent, including by agreeing to be or acting as a child’s parent.185 
Similarly, the UPA cabins adults’ ability to avoid parental obligations, in-
cluding through short statutes of limitations for challenging the Model Act’s 
parental presumptions.186 In all of these ways, the UPA prioritizes privatiz-
                                                                                                                           
13, 2018), http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act%20(2002) 
[https://perma.cc/L3CR-EDNW] (listing enactments by Alabama, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wyoming). Thus far, two states—
Vermont and Washington—have enacted the 2017 UPA. Legislative Fact Sheet—Parentage Act 
(2017), UNIF. LAW COMM’N (Apr. 13, 2018), http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.
aspx?title=Parentage%20Act%20(2017) [https://perma.cc/6DSS-TGSR]. See generally UNIF. 
PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000, amended 2017). 
 181 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 202 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000, amended 2017) (quoting 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973)). 
 182 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000, amended 2002); Id. arts. 7–8. 
 183 Memorandum of Jamie Pedersen, Chair & Courtney Joslin, Reporter, Unif. Parentage Act 
Drafting Comm., to Unif. Law Comm’rs (June 13, 2016), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/
parentage/2016AM_AmendedParentage_Issues%20memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/62KX-637P]. 
 184 PROPOSED UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, art. 3, reporter’s cmt. (Comm. Mtg. Draft Oct. 28–29, 
2016). 
 185 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2) & cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000, amended 2017) 
(holding out child as one’s own gives rise to presumption of parentage); id. § 609(d) (outlining de 
facto parentage claim); id. § 703 (“An individual who consents . . . to assisted reproduction by a 
woman with the intent to be a parent of a child conceived by the assisted reproduction is a parent 
of the child.”). 
 186 Id. § 608(b) (instituting a two-year statute of limitations for challenging parentage of a 
presumed or adjudicated parent or an acknowledged father). 
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ing dependency, with adults’ intentions considered only insofar as they seek 
entry into, not exit from, parent-child relationships.187 
Functional doctrines like parental estoppel and de facto parenthood 
similarly work only to confirm, not to discontinue, parental responsibili-
ties.188 Generally speaking, estoppel functions to prevent an adult from dis-
claiming a parental role he or she had previously been fulfilling.189 Similar-
ly, de facto parenthood attaches to an adult who has lived with a child for an 
extended period of time during which he or she performed significant care-
taking for the child.190 Courts employ these doctrines in a range of con-
texts—from same-sex parents191 to step-parents192 to functional fathers193—
in order to “protect the parent-child relationship presumed to have devel-
                                                                                                                           
 187 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (Ct. App. 1998) (under 
UPA and California Family Code, husband and wife became legal parents by contracting with 
surrogate for implantation of genetically unrelated embryo); cf. ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT: WHAT 
PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND WHAT SOCIETY OWES PARENTS 5 (2004) (“[S]ociety ex-
pects—and needs—parents to persist in their role for 18 years, or longer if needed.”). 
 188 See, e.g., Appleton, Forgotten Family Law, supra note 19, at 43 (describing “family law’s 
recent functional turn”); see also JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE 
THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 2 (2011) (stating that “family 
law follows family life”). 
 189 See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(b) & cmt. b (2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLU-
TION]. 
 190 See id. § 2.03(1)(c); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609(d) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000, amend-
ed 2017). 
 191 See, e.g., Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 695–96 (Cal. 2005) (concluding woman 
was estopped from challenging her pre-birth stipulation of parentage of her partner’s child); Elisa 
B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005) (concluding that because woman had acted as 
children’s mother, she was a presumed mother under California’s UPA). 
 192 See, e.g., Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850, 855 (Alaska 1982) (holding that “where a step-
parent has assumed the status of in loco parentis, a step-child is a ‘child of the marriage’” within 
the meaning of the custody statute); Kilborn v. Carey, 140 A.3d 461, 467 (Me. 2016) (affirming 
trial court’s declaration that step-father was child’s de facto parent); Simmons v. Simmons, 486 
N.W.2d 788, 791 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that “a former stepparent who was in loco 
parentis with the former stepchild may be entitled to visitation under the common law”); In re 
Custody of B.M.H., 315 P.3d 470, 479 (Wash. 2013) (permitting former step-parent to seek custo-
dy under de facto parentage doctrine). 
 193 Most states refuse as a matter of public policy to disestablish paternity where legal fathers 
were mistaken about their biological parenthood, whether courts rely on estoppel or res judicata 
grounds. See, e.g., Boone v. Ballinger, 228 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (equitable estoppel); 
Martin v. Pierce, 257 S.W.3d 82 (Ark. 2007) (paternity established pursuant to divorce decree is 
res judicata); Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904, 910 (Vt. 1998) (defending res judicata based on “the 
interests of the state, the family, and the child in maintaining the continuity, financial support, and 
psychological security of an established parent-child relationship”); see also Baker, supra note 
120, at 31 (stating that “a growing number of courts are holding non-biologically related men 
responsible for the support of children for whom they have been functioning as fathers”). 
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oped under these . . . circumstances.”194 These doctrines are intent-based: 
They recognize an adult’s choice to parent a child to whom he or she was 
not initially obligated. But parental estoppel and de facto parenthood work 
only to cement family ties, showing again that the law recognizes parental 
intent only when it serves to privatize a child’s dependency. 
Courts’ refusal to enforce adults’ contracts that disclaim child support 
provide a further example of how parentage law permits only one kind of 
choice. States refuse to allow parents to bargain away an existing child’s 
right to financial support, holding that the right belongs to the child.195 Nor 
do courts recognize pre-conception contracts absolving one sexual partner 
of financial responsibility for the resulting child.196 Outcomes vary when 
the mother conceives through do-it-yourself artificial insemination, but 
courts are generally unwilling to relieve known genetic fathers of parental 
responsibility when the resulting child requires public support.197 No matter 
his or her intent, a sufficiently proximate adult cannot easily decline the 
state-imposed duty to provide for a child’s dependency. Where private sup-
port is at stake, choice is a one-way ratchet. 
All of these doctrines make clear that the law of parentage elects to 
privatize children’s dependency even when the result is to curtail adults’ 
autonomy. Although the urgency of children’s developmental needs sup-
ports this outcome, modern parentage law makes little effort to justify its 
position in these terms. Instead, the doctrine co-opts the language of choice, 
relying on intent when adults wish to parent and equating sexual contact 
                                                                                                                           
 194 PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 189, at § 2.03, cmt. b; see also UNIF. 
PARENTAGE ACT § 609(d)(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000, amended 2017) (requiring de facto 
parent to have “established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child which is parental 
in nature”). 
 195 See, e.g., Kristine M. v. David P., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 748, 752–53 (Ct. App. 2006) (voiding 
parents’ agreement terminating father’s parental rights and responsibilities as against public poli-
cy); In re Carr, 938 A.2d 89, 97–98 (N.H. 2007) (imposing support obligations despite parents’ 
agreement to the contrary); see also Frisch v. Henrichs, 736 N.W.2d 85, 102 (Wis. 2007) (voiding 
contract setting ceiling on child support because “the child’s best interests transcend an agreement 
or stipulation of the parties” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
 196 Budnick v. Silverman, 805 So. 2d 1112, 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (voiding pre-
conception agreement relieving man of all parental responsibilities as against public policy); Straub 
v. B.M.T. ex rel. Todd, 645 N.E.2d 597, 601 (Ind. 1994) (concluding “there is no such thing as ‘arti-
ficial insemination by intercourse’” and invalidating non-paternity agreement); Ferguson v. McKi-
ernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1246 (Pa. 2007) (“In the case of traditional sexual reproduction, there simply 
is no question that the parties to any resultant conception and birth may not contract between them-
selves to deny the child the support he or she requires.”); Kesler v. Weniger, 744 A.2d 794, 796 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2000) (“declin[ing] to recognize a category of ‘artificial insemination by intercourse’” and 
stating that a child’s right to support “cannot be bargained away before conception any more than it 
can be bargained away after birth, nor can it be extinguished by principles of estoppel”). 
 197 See Appleton, Between the Binaries, supra note 19, at 106 (describing cases). 
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with consent to parenthood when adults attempt to avoid parental responsi-
bilities. With the overarching imperative to privatize dependency cloaked 
only sometimes by choice, the law appears bifurcated, with some adults 
conscripted into parenthood against their will. At the same time, the lack of 
much collective support for childrearing means that parenthood imposes 
high personal costs, especially on low-income parents. Modern parentage 
law thus fails to resolve the tension between privatizing dependency and the 
new family freedom. 
B. Cohabitant Obligations: Leaning Toward Autonomy 
Whereas the private support principle predominates in parentage law, 
choice logic appears to carry more weight in disputes between adult inti-
mates, as the laws of property distribution and alimony show. This Section 
examines property distribution through the lens of cohabitant, rather than 
marital, obligations for several reasons. First, the law of marital property 
distribution has begun to settle around formally egalitarian norms, while the 
law of cohabitant obligations is doctrinally fractured and normatively con-
tested.198 Second, marital obligations can be justified consistent with choice 
about obligations. Consent to a state’s equitable distribution or community 
property regime may be inferred from consent to marital status, and marital 
agreements allow spouses some latitude to customize their property obliga-
tions in deviation from the default regime.199 Cohabitant property disputes, 
in contrast, tend to arise at the end of relationships unsanctioned by the 
formal consent to obligations upon which choice logic insists. Finally and 
most importantly, neoliberalism’s impact on marital obligations is best ob-
served in the context of alimony, discussed in the next Section. 
Scholars generally approach the question of what unmarried cohabit-
ants owe one another upon relationship dissolution in terms of status versus 
contract, debating which legal regime should govern cohabitant liability.200 
Courts, on the other hand, usually refuse to redistribute unless generally 
                                                                                                                           
 198 Compare FINEMAN, supra note 105, at 39 (arguing that post-reform divorce law institutes 
formal equality at the expense of substantive equality), and Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, 
Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 77 (2004) (describing “the ideal of marriage as 
an egalitarian liberal community”), and Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Di-
vorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227, 1230 (noting the “commonly acknowledged . . . con-
ception of marriage as a partnership of two equals”), and Gregg Strauss, Why the State Cannot 
“Abolish Marriage”: A Partial Defense of Legal Marriage, 90 IND. L.J. 1261, 1314–15 (2015) 
(characterizing the current divorce regime as based on equality norms), with infra notes 200–273 
and accompanying text (describing the generally unequal distributions of property accumulated 
during cohabitation under various legal regimes). 
 199 See supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text. 
 200 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
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applicable legal grounds justify deviating from title theory.201 But the prob-
lem is more fundamentally one of competing neoliberal principles: whether 
to respect the new family freedom by refusing to impose ex post family-
based obligations on the richer party, or to privatize a poorer party’s de-
pendency by granting recovery despite ambiguity about family intent. 
This problem is intractable, with courts and scholars able to honor, at 
best, one principle over the other. When courts and scholars vindicate au-
tonomy claims, precluding recovery unless cohabitants have ceremonially 
married or formally contracted, they ignore the fact of dependency and in-
terdependency in adult relationships. And when courts and scholars take 
dependency and interdependency into account by redistributing property to 
the poorer party, choice logic rejects their ex post justificatory logic as coer-
cive and offensive. Even middle-of-the-road equitable approaches cannot 
effectively mediate the tension. Courts’ and scholars’ disagreement about 
how to approach cohabitant obligations reflects the difficulty of honoring 
the new family freedom while using non-marital relationships to make adult 
partners responsible for one other’s dependency. 
As a functional matter, however, the cases tend toward one outcome: 
Without family formalities, it is very difficult for cohabitants to recover on 
property division claims.202 The law of cohabitant obligations appears to 
vindicate autonomy, as courts deciding property disputes employ assump-
tion of risk logic to assign entitlements according to formal title.203 But 
against the backdrop of minimal state support, refusing to redistribute effec-
tively requires poorer partners to survive off their own market earnings. The 
foundational value governing cohabitant relationships therefore remains 
privatized dependency, which the law achieves by (unrealistically) deeming 
all adults capable of self-support. 
1. Endorsing Choice, Ignoring Dependency 
A minority of states, discussed below, take a “strict choice” approach 
to cohabitant obligations. These jurisdictions refuse to redistribute property 
unless the parties have expressly indicated their consent to family obliga-
tions by either ceremonially marrying or contracting with a requisite degree 
of specificity. Because the predictable result is to all but preclude the non-
                                                                                                                           
 201 Albertina Antognini, The Law of Nonmarriage, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1, 8 (2017) (arguing that 
the law of nonmarriage denies or minimizes redistribution to poorer cohabitants, who are usually 
women); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 56 (2016) (stating that 
the law “accepts the autonomy of such couples with respect to financial matters and imposes al-
most no obligations without either an express agreement or evidence of combined assets”). 
 202 See Antognini, supra note 201, at 8. 
 203 See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 201, at 56. 
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title holder’s ability to recover, these jurisdictions appear to privilege choice 
over privatizing dependency. 
Several jurisdictions protect the richer party’s ability to choose his ob-
ligations by refusing to enforce cohabitant agreements unless they exhibit 
certain formalities. Florida, Minnesota, and Texas will enforce cohabitant 
contracts only if they are executed in writing and signed by the parties.204 
New York will enforce oral agreements between cohabitants only if they are 
express.205 These jurisdictions require formalities in order to avoid the evi-
dentiary difficulty described by the New York Court of Appeals in Morone 
v. Morone: 
[A]ttempt[ing] through hindsight to sort out the intentions of the 
parties and affix jural significance to conduct carried out within 
an essentially private and generally noncontractual relationship 
runs too great a risk of error. . . . There is . . . substantially greater 
risk of emotion-laden afterthought, not to mention fraud, in at-
tempting to ascertain by implication what services, if any, were 
rendered gratuitously and what compensation, if any, the parties 
intended to be paid.206 
But because most cohabitants do not negotiate, let alone memorialize in 
writing, explicit contracts,207 these states’ approaches do little to protect the 
economically weaker partner, who has no cognizable claim to resources 
accumulated by the richer partner over the course of the relationship. The 
default rule against recognizing cohabitant obligations thus becomes a de 
facto regime of strong property protections for the title holder. 
Georgia, Illinois, and Louisiana seem to go further, rejecting any claim 
arising from a cohabitant relationship.208 Although these states’ courts rea-
                                                                                                                           
 204 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 513.075, 513.076 (West 2018); TEXAS FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.108 
(West 2018); Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (applying Statute of 
Frauds requirement “that contracts made upon consideration of marriage . . . be in writing . . . . to 
non-marital, nuptial-like agreements”). North Dakota announced, and then retreated from, a simi-
lar rule. Compare Kohler v. Flynn, 493 N.W.2d 647, 649 (N.D. 1992) (“If live-in companions 
intend to share property, they should express that intention in writing.”), with McKechnie v. Berg, 
667 N.W.2d 628, 632 (N.D. 2003) (stating that “joint bank accounts constitute writings evidencing 
intent”). 
 205 Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 1980) (requiring cohabitant agreements 
to demonstrate an “explicit and structured understanding”). 
 206 Id. 
 207 See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson, Legal Planning for Unmar-
ried Committed Partners: Empirical Lessons or a Preventative and Therapeutic Approach, 41 
ARIZ. L. REV. 417, 436 (1999). 
 208 Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81, 82 (Ga. 1977) (stating that “neither a court of law nor a 
court of equity will lend its aid to either party to a contract founded upon an illegal or immoral 
consideration,” and that “the fact of cohabitation . . . would constitute immoral consideration”); 
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son from moral disapproval of cohabitation, which predates the substantive 
due process revolution and may now be constitutionally suspect, they em-
ploy choice rhetoric and reach property-protecting results.209 For courts in 
these states justify their refusal to redistribute between cohabitants explicit-
ly in terms of the partners’ choice not to marry.210 Illinois even extended this 
logic to a lesbian couple whose entire relationship preceded the state’s 
recognition of same-sex marriage in a recent case, Blumenthal v. Brewer.211 
To encourage marriage, these states impose what could be considered penal-
ty default rules:212 Courts preclude implied contract and equitable claims 
between cohabitants, even though they are willing to enforce certain written 
agreements between them and to consider claims arising “independently” of 
their intimate relationships.213 Thus, like states that rely on contract formali-
                                                                                                                           
Blumenthal v. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d 834, 839 (Ill. 2016), reh’g denied (Oct. 20, 2016), aff’g Hewitt 
v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979) (forbidding courts from “enforc[ing] mutual property rights 
where the rights asserted are rooted in a marriage-like relationship between the parties”); 
Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 323 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that cohabitants 
“have no rights in each other’s property”). 
 209 See Blumenthal, 69 N.E.3d at 861 (Theis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(criticizing the majority for “reaffirm[ing] an oddly myopic and moralistic view of cohabitation”); 
Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d at 326 (“[D]iscouraging the establishment of a sexual relationship with-
out ceremonial marriage is in the interest of protecting the moral fabric of society . . . .”); see also 
Abrams v. Massell, 586 S.E.2d 435, 441 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“[A]s long as binding precedent 
from the Supreme Court of Georgia continues to define sexual relationships between unmarried 
consenting adults as immoral, we must set aside contracts . . . that are founded upon or that are in 
furtherance of such relationships.”). 
 210 Blumenthal, 69 N.E.3d at 856, 859 (adducing in support of ruling “the legislative intent to 
provide certain rights and benefits to those who participate in the institution of marriage” and 
Illinois “public policy . . . disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to know-
ingly unmarried cohabitants”); Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d at 326 (“Unwed cohabitors involved in 
concubinage relationships have voluntarily chosen not to marry and they should not expect to 
receive the civil effects flowing by virtue of a marital state.”); cf. Van Dyck v. Van Dyck, 425 
S.E.2d 853, 855 (Ga. 1993) (Sears-Collins, J., concurring) (describing law permitting modification 
of alimony upon recipient’s cohabitation in a meretricious relationship as “a penalty accorded 
unwed heterosexual couples who live together who have the choice of taking advantage of the 
benefits of marriage”). 
 211 69 N.E.3d at 869 (Theis, J., dissenting upon denial of rehearing); see also id. at 868 (sug-
gesting it may be “irrational and discriminatory to deny the protections of the common law to 
persons who never could have used the marriage provisions because of their sexual orientation”). 
 212 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (“Penalty defaults are designed to give at least one 
party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and therefore to choose af-
firmatively the contract provision they prefer.”). 
 213 Compare Blumenthal, 69 N.E.3d at 852 (stating that “individuals acting privately by them-
selves, without the involvement of the State, cannot create marriage-like benefits”), with Abrams, 
586 S.E.2d at 441 (enforcing cohabitants’ written contract to make a will because “any romantic 
or sexual involvement between the parties was . . . ‘incidental to the contract rather than required 
by it’”), and Phillips v. Blankenship, 554 S.E.2d 231, 233 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (authorizing cohab-
itants to pursue equitable claims not “based on sexual intercourse”), and Blumenthal, 69 N.E.3d at 
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ties, states that regulate from morality require intimate partners formally to 
choose their obligations through marriage or contract, or assume the risk of 
walking away from the relationship empty-handed. 
Scholars prioritizing choice do not suggest adopting “strict choice” le-
gal regimes, but their approach to cohabitant obligations is structurally 
similar. Emphasizing the importance of protecting intimate partners’ expec-
tations, they argue that the law should not impose relationship-based obliga-
tions unless cohabitants chose to take them on through contract.214 Scholars 
advocating family law pluralism also value choice about obligations. In 
their view, the state should provide a menu of relationship statuses and en-
force partners’ contracts precisely so that intimate partners are free to self-
define their rights and responsibilities toward one another.215 
Respecting intimate partners’ ex ante decisions about how to order 
their affairs may, however, result in denying an economically vulnerable 
partner recovery upon relationship dissolution. “Choice” scholars address 
this concern, which sounds in equity as well as dependency, in several 
ways. Marsha Garrison tackles it head on, arguing that because cohabitation 
generally does not result in pooling of resources, dependency, or unjust en-
richment, already-established remedies can provide recovery in the rare 
cases when redistribution is appropriate.216 June Carbone and Naomi Cahn 
go even further, arguing that because cohabitants may eschew marriage pre-
cisely to avoid mutual property obligations, it “makes sense for courts to 
treat [them] as two independent units who have not assumed responsibility 
for each other after a break-up.”217 Other scholars would supplement a 
menu of state-recognized “alternatives to marriage,” whose availability 
would presumably decrease the frequency of legally unstructured cohabita-
tion, with a “functionalist approach to relationship recognition” when par-
                                                                                                                           
856 (permitting cohabitants to bring common-law claims that “ha[ve] an independent economic 
basis apart from the parties’ relationship”), and Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d at 325 (allowing cohab-
itants to “assert [their] rights in [a] common endeavor” if it is a “commercial enterprise . . . inde-
pendent of the illegal cohabitation”). 
 214 See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 120, at 884–97 (arguing against conscripting cohabiting 
couples into marital property regimes); Howard O. Hunter, An Essay on Contract and Status: 
Race, Marriage, and the Meretricious Spouse, 64 VA. L. REV. 1039, 1095 (1978) (arguing that 
contract approach best captures cohabitants’ intent); David Westfall, Forcing Incidents of Mar-
riage on Unmarried Cohabitants: The American Law Institute’s Principles of Family Dissolution, 
76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 1467 (2001) (criticizing status-based treatment of cohabitant rela-
tionships as “reflect[ing] a profound distrust for individuals’ efforts to set the terms for intimate 
relationships to meet their own needs”). 
 215 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 100, at 1886; Franke, supra note 105, at 2702–06; Matsu-
mura, supra note 105, at 203; Stein, supra note 105, at 349. 
 216 Garrison, supra note 120, at 884–85. 
 217 Carbone & Cahn, supra note 201, at 102. 
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ties fail nonetheless to enter a status or execute a contract.218 In seeking to 
defuse worries that prioritizing formal ex ante intent creates injustice, these 
scholars implicitly recognize the tension between respecting property rights 
and providing for dependency. But insofar as their attempts to mediate this 
tension fall short, economic harm to the vulnerable partner remains an una-
voidable cost of privileging choice about obligations. 
States and scholars prioritizing choice emphasize cohabitants’ inten-
tions before and during their relationship, but the result is to ignore the 
problem of dependency upon its dissolution. Strict-choice states, which de-
ny recovery when intimate partners fail to formalize their family intentions, 
end up elevating the richer cohabitant’s property rights over the poorer co-
habitant’s claims for economic justice. Scholars sympathetic to choice pro-
pose reforms to minimize its effects on poorer parties, but their willingness 
to let some costs lie where they fall shows that they, too, fail to resolve the 
conflict between privatized dependency and choice about obligations. 
2. Recognizing Dependency, Fictionalizing Choice 
The majority of states permit cohabitants to bring a variety of legal 
claims against a former partner.219 Although litigants pursue and scholars 
advance many theories of recovery, these tend to sound in three general cat-
egories: relationship-based entitlements, implied-in-fact contract claims, 
and equitable obligations. I discuss the first two categories together because 
they approach the tension between dependency and autonomy similarly. Nei-
ther, however, predictably results in recovery. 
Scholars discussing and courts applying relationship-based and implied-
in-fact contract doctrines speak the language of choice: Lacking formal indi-
cia such as a marriage license or written contract, they scrutinize the cohabit-
ants’ relationship for signs that the partners intended to take on family obli-
gations.220 But because subjective intent is difficult to discern, courts and 
scholars often impute it ex post, via functional analyses of the parties’ ob-
jectively observable conduct.221 And since choice logic understands only ex 
ante formal consent to legitimate financial obligations, when courts and 
                                                                                                                           
 218 Stein, supra note 105, at 349; see also Matsumura, supra note 105, at 203 (“favor[ing] 
recognizing additional forms of intimate relationships and a more flexible spectrum of intimate 
duties through the expansion of status regimes,” complemented by contract law). 
 219 Blumenthal, 69 N.E.3d at 863 (Theis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Courts 
in a vast majority of . . . states . . . have chosen to recognize claims between former domestic part-
ners . . . .”); PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 189, at § 6.03, reporter’s notes, cmt. b. 
 220 See infra notes 232–237, 239–252 and accompanying text. 
 221 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764 (Wash. 2000); Barnett, supra note 30, 
at 305; Matsumura, supra note 108, at 2048. 
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scholars prioritize dependency provision, they offend the new family free-
dom. 
Relationship-based doctrines attach marital or marriage-like status, and 
therefore obligations, to certain classes of cohabitant relationships. Common-
law marriage jurisdictions recognize as marriages for all purposes the unions 
of parties who agreed to be married, even without a formal ceremony.222 
Technically speaking, couples satisfying this doctrine are not cohabitants at 
all; they are spouses, the dissolution of whose relationship the state’s divorce 
regime governs.223 In the state of Washington, cohabitants living in a “com-
mitted intimate relationship,” formerly called a “meretricious relationship,” 
are entitled to an equitable distribution of property acquired during the rela-
tionship.224 This generous remedy is roughly equivalent to other jurisdictions’ 
schemes for distributing marital property.225 Nevada similarly permits cohab-
itants to “agree to hold property . . . as though it were community property,” 
while Kansas and Oregon allow relationship-based recovery under an implied 
joint venture theory.226 
Many scholars advocate relationship-based approaches because they 
grant the vulnerable party a wide range of valuable legal rights, including 
rights against third parties.227 Some scholars argue for using common-law 
marriage doctrine and variants thereof to resolve cohabitant claims.228 One 
                                                                                                                           
 222 See CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 22 
(2010). Ten U.S. jurisdictions recognize common law marriage. See id. at 26 (“Eleven U.S. juris-
dictions still recognized common law marriage as of 2009—Alabama, Colorado, the District of 
Columbia, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah.”). 
But see ALA. CODE § 30-1-20(a) (2018) (“No common-law marriage may be entered into in this 
state on or after January 1, 2017.”). 
 223 Cf. Cerovic v. Stojkov, 134 A.3d 766, 777 (D.C. 2016) (clarifying that presumption favor-
ing validity of most recent union does not distinguish between common law and ceremonial mar-
riage); H.B. 1163, 120th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2017) (proposing permitting individu-
als to enter written marriage contract without state solemnization). 
 224 Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 835–36 (Wash. 1995); see also id. at 834 (defining 
meretricious relationship as “a stable, marital-like relationship where both parties cohabit with 
knowledge that a lawful marriage between them does not exist”). 
 225 Cf. D.C. CODE § 16-910 (2018) (requiring court to “assign to each party his or her sole and 
separate property acquired prior to the marriage” and equitably distribute the rest upon divorce). 
 226 W. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Nev. 1992); Eaton v. Johnston, 
681 P.2d 606, 610–11 (Kan. 1984); Beal v. Beal, 577 P.2d 507, 510 (Or. 1978); Wilbur v. 
DeLapp, 850 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (“[I]n distributing the property of a domestic 
relationship, we are not precluded from exercising our equitable powers to reach a fair result based 
on the circumstances of each case.”); see also Strauss, supra note 198, at 1280 (describing 
schemes). 
 227 See BOWMAN, supra note 222, at 69–80. 
 228 Id. at 223–29 (proposing that couples should be treated as married after two years of co-
habitation or birth of a common child, unless they contract out of marriage-like obligations); 
Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 UCLA L. 
REV. 1125, 1166–67 (1981) (arguing that cohabitation longer than two years or resulting in a 
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scholar has recently proposed a draft Uniform De Facto Marriage Act that 
“would entitle de facto spouses to all marital rights and obligations under 
both federal and state laws.”229 Perhaps the best-known status-based ap-
proach to cohabitant claims is set forth in the American Law Institute’s 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution. The ALI’s approach, adopted 
by no jurisdiction, would establish a “domestic partnership” status—giving 
rise to mutual relationship-based obligations—for partners “who for a sig-
nificant period of time share a primary residence and a life together as a cou-
ple,” with the latter determined by their conduct during the relationship.230 
Although relationship-based doctrines do a reasonably good job of ad-
dressing dependency when the poorer party prevails,231 they effectively re-
ject the richer party’s claim to choose his family obligations. To be sure, 
these approaches attempt to assuage autonomy concerns by claiming to ef-
fectuate the parties’ intent. Common-law marriage doctrine gives legal ef-
fect to the parties’ “express mutual agreement” to be spouses.232 Recovery 
under the committed intimate relationship doctrine requires “the mutual 
intent of parties to be in” such a relationship.233 And scholarly proposals 
“treat committed behavior occurring over time as signifying . . . intent to 
acquire the rights of formal marriage.”234 But it is difficult to prove a sub-
jective state of intent without the contemporaneous objective signals of that 
intent which family formalities provide.235 As a result, these approaches 
                                                                                                                           
child’s birth should be treated as lawful marriage unless the couple has agreed otherwise); Scott, 
supra note 120, at 259 (proposing that the law integrate cohabitants into the divorce property re-
gime when relationships last longer than five years); see also Garrison, supra note 120, at 885 
(proposing that “a revivified common law marriage doctrine” govern those “couples who express 
marital commitments privately”). 
 229 Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marriage Is on the Decline and Cohabitation Is on the Rise: At 
What Point, If Ever, Should Unmarried Partners Acquire Marital Rights?, 50 FAM. L.Q. 215, 246 
(2016). 
 230 PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 189, at § 6.03(1) & cmt. b; see also Ira 
Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” Was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 
1377–79 (2001) (describing ALI approach). 
 231 Most cohabitants do not prevail on their claims, even in states with more generous legal 
regimes. Antognini, supra note 201, at 8; Carbone & Cahn, supra note 201, at 56; cf. Strauss, 
supra note 198, at 1279 (discussing relationship-based doctrines’ limited scope and the “special 
hurdles” plaguing implied-in-fact contract cases). 
 232 See, e.g., Bansda v. Wheeler, 995 A.2d 189, 198 (D.C. 2010) (stating that “the proponent 
of the [common-law] marriage must show that the parties cohabitated as husband and wife, fol-
lowing an express mutual agreement, which must be words of the present tense”). 
 233 In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 771 (Wash. 2000).  
 234 Waggoner, supra note 229, at 235–36. 
 235 See Barnett, supra note 30, at 305 (“[W]e never have direct access to another individual’s 
subjective mental state.”); John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 492 (1975) (describing Wills Act formalities as serving “[t]he primary pur-
pose of . . . provid[ing] the court with reliable evidence of testamentary intent”); Matsumura, su-
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must employ a functional ex post analysis, examining the totality of the par-
ties’ relationship to determine whether a state-defined regime of marital or 
quasi-marital obligations should attach to it.236 These approaches thus risk 
“conscript[ing]” the richer party into family obligations that he did not 
choose ex ante and may have actively sought to avoid, rendering consent to 
obligation a legal conclusion rather than a subjective fact.237 Though these 
doctrines aid the poorer party by making the richer party responsible for her 
dependency, they violate the new family freedom by rendering “choice” a 
legal fiction. 
Most contract claims between cohabitants involve implied-in-fact, ra-
ther than express, contracts.238 An implied-in-fact contract is one in which 
the parties’ “mutual agreement and intent to promise . . . have . . . not been 
expressed in words,” and thus must be “inferred in whole or in part from” 
the parties’ “course of dealing.”239 Under this approach, as famously stated 
in Marvin v. Marvin, courts “inquire into the conduct of the parties to de-
termine whether that conduct demonstrates . . . some . . . tacit understanding 
between the parties.”240 Because litigants often plead agreements for equal 
property division and post-relationship support,241 cohabitant contract 
claims seek functionally to create marital obligations, and thereby to graft 
marriage’s approach to dependency onto cohabitant relationships. 
                                                                                                                           
pra note 108, at 2048 (“Proof that a couple has engaged in the required legal formalities is usually 
a reliable indicator of the mutual assumption of marital duties because these acts have a broadly 
recognized social and legal significance: they serve to highlight the legal relevance of the acts that 
are performed, warn people away from making legal commitments they don’t intend, and ulti-
mately serve as proof of the choice the couple has made.”). 
 236 See Ellman, supra note 230, at 1378 (describing ALI Principles’ approach as “identifying 
those nonmarital relationships which bear a sufficient resemblance to marriage to justify and re-
quire similar, post-relationship legal obligations”); see also Pennington, 14 P.3d at 770 (consider-
ing factors like “continuous cohabitation, duration of the relationship, purpose of the relationship, 
pooling of resources and services for mutual benefit, and the intent of the parties” to determine 
whether relationships were meretricious); Barnett, supra note 30, at 301 (describing “the inescap-
able need of individuals in society and those trying to administer a coherent legal system to rely 
. . . on an individual’s behavior that apparently manifests their assent to a transfer of entitle-
ments”). 
 237 Garrison, supra note 120, at 818. 
 238 Strauss, supra note 198, at 1293 (“If intimate partners are going to regulate their economic 
lives by contract, almost all of these agreements will be implied-in-fact contracts for which the 
court infers the parties’ promises from their conduct.”). 
 239 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1:5 (4th ed. 2017); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 & cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2018); cf. id. § 4 cmt. b (distinguishing 
implied contracts or contracts implied in fact from quasi-contracts or contracts implied in law, 
which “are obligations created by law for reasons of justice” and better classified under the law of 
restitution). 
 240 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976). 
 241 See, e.g., id. 
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But analogizing cohabitation to marriage can run afoul of the new fam-
ily freedom. For in seeking to imply contracts for marital obligations, poor-
er cohabitants ask courts to read marriage-like intent from their partners’ 
conduct. Elizabeth Scott argues that “[a] couple who live[s] together for 
many years, sharing a life and financial resources, . . . can be presumed to 
intend to share the property acquired during the relationship,” and that the 
law should enforce this implicit agreement.242 But this proposition is empir-
ically debatable; it may reflect majoritarian assumptions or further socially 
valued ends, rather than represent the actual views of the parties them-
selves.243 As a result, implied contract theories violate the new family free-
dom’s stringent definition of “choice,” which borders on a subjective or will 
theory of contract.244 As explained above, “ascertain[ing]” “the parties’ in-
tention” via an ex post “inquiry into the nature of their relationship” contra-
venes the new family freedom’s rigid insistence upon formal ex ante con-
sent to family obligations.245 
Implied contract claims between cohabitants are problematic under 
even an objective theory of contract.246 Autonomy-minded scholars criticize 
the Marvin court’s suggestion that courts “presume” that cohabitants “‘in-
tend to deal fairly with each other’” for potentially inviting “wholesale in-
terference with private contracting because of wide ranging judicial percep-
tions of what is ‘fair.’”247 Even scholars who favor redistribution between 
intimates recognize that cohabitants’ implied contract claims tend to shade 
into equity. Because several traditional contract doctrines—including the 
requirement of bargained-for consideration and the presumption that inti-
mates render services gratuitously—frustrate these kinds of claims,248 those 
decisions that do find implied contracts between cohabitants sometimes 
“appear to vindicate an equitable rather than a contractual principle.”249 Ira 
Ellman describes such cases as “stretching contract doctrine beyond recog-
                                                                                                                           
 242 Elizabeth S. Scott, Domestic Partnerships, Implied Contracts, and Law Reform, in RE-
CONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTES’ PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 331, 342 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006). 
 243 Carbone & Cahn, supra note 201, at 108. 
 244 See Barnett, supra note 30, at 272 (“Will theories [of contract] maintain that commitments 
are enforceable because the promisor has ‘willed’ or chosen to be bound by his commitment.”). 
 245 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 117 n.11. 
 246 See Barnett, supra note 30, at 300–09 (outlining a consent theory of contract). 
 247 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 121; Westfall, supra note 214, at 1471. 
 248 Strauss, supra note 198, at 1279, 1293; see, e.g., Williams v. Ormsby, 966 N.E.2d 255, 
263–64 (Ohio 2012); Featherston v. Steinhoff, 575 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). 
 249 PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 189, at § 6.03, cmt. b (stating that “hav-
ing concluded that a particular set of facts demands a remedy,” courts “may stretch ordinary con-
tract principles to fit the remedy within a contractual rubric”). 
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nition in order to justify a remedy,”250 while Hanoch Dagan pronounces the 
“contractual framework . . . merely rhetorical in cases where courts use only 
flimsy ‘evidence’ for implying a contract.”251 The muddled way in which 
courts approach these particular claims suggests that the implied contract 
framework often smuggles in concerns external to an intent-based inquiry. 
As a result, judges adjudicating such claims may risk conflating their own 
ex post assessment of a relationship and its equities with the parties’ ex ante 
intentions.252 For all of these reasons, in the rare instances when courts grant 
plaintiffs recovery on implied contract claims, they do so in a way that 
choice about obligations deems illegitimate. 
Most often, though, the implied contract approach fails to result in re-
covery. Because courts struggle to fill in ambiguous or silent contract terms 
without reliable evidence of shared intent, proving and collecting on an im-
plied cohabitant agreement is notoriously difficult, even in cases where re-
covery appears to be justified.253 The implied contract “inquiry tends to 
yield an outcome of no recovery, especially in (the not infrequent) cases 
where there is a power relationship between the parties that allows” one 
party “to capture systematically a disproportionately high share of the bene-
fits of their relationship . . . and bear a disproportionately low share of its 
costs.”254 In Friedman v. Friedman, for example, the California Court of 
Appeal found insufficient evidence to support an implied agreement for the 
man to provide post-relationship pendente lite financial support to his disa-
bled female partner, despite the parties’ twenty-one years of marriage-like 
cohabitation.255 Because the implied-in-fact contract approach most often 
fails to provide recovery for the vulnerable partner but violates choice about 
obligations when it does, it succeeds in neither addressing dependency nor 
satisfying the new family freedom. 
3. Seeking an Elusive Balance 
Courts also use equitable doctrines to do rough justice between cohabit-
ants. Indeed, “[t]he various restitutionary headings,” which include “unjust 
                                                                                                                           
 250 Ellman, supra note 230, at 1372. 
 251 HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 169 (2004). 
 252 Cf. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 124 (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[W]e should stop and 
consider the ramifications before creating economic obligations which may . . . contravene the 
intention of the parties . . . .”). 
 253 See, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 1980) (describing the high 
“risk of error” in adjudicating cohabitant contract claims).  
 254 DAGAN, supra note 251, at 170; see also BOWMAN, supra note 222, at 51 (questioning 
efficacy of contract remedies). 
 255 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 899 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 
559 (Ct. App. 1981) (vacating rehabilitative award as lacking legal basis). 
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enrichment, resulting trust, constructive trust, quantum meruit,” and quasi- or 
implied-in-law contract, supply “the main source of” cohabitant recovery.256 
These doctrines share a flexible, ex post approach aimed at containing and 
remedying a party’s opportunistic behavior.257 Although some scholars cham-
pion equitable remedies as a “middle-of-the-road approach” to cohabitant 
claims, these doctrines fail either to satisfy the new family freedom or to ef-
fectively provide for a poorer partner’s material needs.258 
Equitable remedies work to prevent exploitation when an individual’s 
efforts increase the property of another, who by legal title alone would re-
tain the enhanced value. Equity is thus concerned primarily with contribu-
tion. Because liability in equity does not turn on the parties’ intent, this doc-
trinal framework avoids some of the difficulties plaguing other approaches 
to cohabitant obligations. 
But equitable remedies threaten to infringe the new family freedom in 
a different way. Section 28 of the recent Restatement (Third) of Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment, which governs restitution between cohabitants, 
provides as follows: 
If two persons have formerly lived together in a relationship re-
sembling marriage, and if one of them owns a specific asset to 
which the other has made substantial, uncompensated contribu-
tions in the form of property or services, the person making such 
contributions has a claim in restitution against the owner as nec-
essary to prevent unjust enrichment upon the dissolution of the re-
lationship.259 
Section 28 conducts an explicitly ex post analysis focused on objectively 
observable facts and the demands of justice, and thus cannot be accused of 
fictionalizing choice. But it relaxes two of restitution’s “traditional con-
straints,” which make recovery “[un]available for . . . voluntary transfers” 
or “to claimants who reasonably could have negotiated a consensual ex-
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change.”260 Under these traditional assumptions, “neither [cohabitant’s] 
contributions could unjustly enrich the other.”261 The Restatement justifies 
its position on the ground that, in the cohabitant context, even an “essential-
ly gratuitous” “transfer . . . may be made in the expectation that the donor 
will share, directly or indirectly, in the resulting benefits,” and that a 
“claimant should not be held to have assumed the risk that things would 
turn out as they did.”262 Whereas Candace Kovacic-Fleischer supports the 
provision as “a good step toward protecting the frustrated expectations of 
financially vulnerable, trusting people,”263 Emily Sherwin argues that Sec-
tion 28 “test[s] the scope and meaning of the concept of unjust enrichment” 
in a way that risks encroaching on individual property rights.264 At the core 
of Sherwin’s argument is the well-accepted premise that restitution is “a 
unified body of law” providing a “theory of legal recovery,” just as contract 
and tort law do.265 Thus, traditional restitution law establishes “a distinct set 
of limits on benefit-based liability” whose purpose is to protect the owner’s 
autonomy to choose his own financial obligations.266 But because Section 
28 relaxes these rules in cohabitant relationships, courts adjudicating resti-
tution claims are left with “nothing to guide them but their own unanchored 
sense of injustice,” which will inevitably take into account the claimant’s 
“state of hardship.”267 Insofar as restitution law sheds its protective doctri-
nal limits, it risks violating the new family freedom. 
And because equity’s benchmark is contribution, it fails to impose ob-
ligations sufficient to meet dependency needs. Even when claimants prevail 
on unjust enrichment claims, their recoveries are relatively limited. Cynthia 
Grant Bowman characterizes relief in restitution as “hard to obtain or piti-
fully small,” while Albertina Antognini argues that unjust enrichment awards 
“generally” amount to “much less than half of the assets accumulated during 
the relationship.”268 In Watts v. Watts, for example, a jury awarded the woman 
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only ten to thirteen percent of the property accumulated during the couple’s 
“marriage-like relationship.”269 Similarly, in Gazvoda v. Wright, the woman 
received less than twenty-five percent of the relationship assets.270 The law 
of restitution thus fails to do justice between cohabitants from the perspec-
tive either of choice about obligations or dependency provision. 
4. The Functional Result: Requiring Self-Support 
The inevitable conflict between the new family freedom and privatized 
dependency both shapes and frustrates states’ and scholars’ attempts to re-
solve cohabitant claims. Beneath the imperative to respect cohabitants’ 
choices not to marry or formally contract lies a commitment to strong prop-
erty entitlements, which renders redistribution of assets anathema unless the 
title holder consents to the transfer.271 On the other hand, assigning the rich-
er partner responsibility for the poorer partner’s economic well-being would 
further neoliberalism’s strict allocation of dependency provision duties to 
the family.272 The tension between these conflicting principles goes far to-
ward explaining why neither states nor scholars can agree about which legal 
rules should govern cohabitant relationships. 
Despite its lack of formal consensus, however, the law of cohabitant ob-
ligations leans toward a single functional outcome. Because various doctrines 
preclude, limit, or otherwise render uncertain non-title holders’ claims to 
property acquired during a cohabitant relationship, the law as a whole effec-
tively disfavors redistribution between intimates who neither ceremonially 
married nor formally contracted.273 At least superficially, this body of law 
appears to vindicate autonomy. As a foundational matter, however, the private 
support imperative prevails, with the law expecting each former partner to 
support herself—a trend even more evident in the modern law of alimony. 
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C. Alimony: Enforcing Post-Marital Independence 
Like the laws of parentage and cohabitant obligations, alimony doc-
trine reflects the tension between the new family freedom and privatizing 
dependency. Unlike parental and cohabitant obligations, alimony could be 
considered “chosen,” since it imposes support duties upon former spouses 
who, in marrying, consented to provide for one another.274 But alimony con-
travenes no-fault divorce law’s “clean break” norms by granting recipients a 
lien on payors’ post-marital income streams.275 Not only does alimony in-
creasingly offend neoliberal ideas about property entitlements, but it often 
does so with the explicit goal of privatizing dependency.276 Scholars seek to 
resolve this tension by justifying long-term alimony in egalitarian terms, but 
recent state reform efforts concentrate instead on encouraging formerly de-
pendent spouses to achieve economic self-sufficiency.277 Modern alimony 
doctrine seeks to protect property rights by shifting the private support re-
sponsibility onto poorer spouses post-divorce—a development that shows 
just how profoundly neoliberal commitments are reconstructing the family. 
Justifying spousal support has always been a difficult task.278 As June 
Carbone and Naomi Cahn note, “alimony is deeply rooted in the inferior 
status of women, and even considering its role in protecting vulnerable 
women, it has been the subject of claims of incoherence in every genera-
tion.”279 Defined as a “court-ordered allowance that one spouse pays to the 
other spouse for maintenance and support” during separation or after di-
vorce, alimony originated as a remedy granted upon a couple’s legal separa-
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tion.280 Since this ecclesiastical “‘divorce’ from bed and board” did not sev-
er marital bonds, a wife remained under the legal disabilities of coverture 
and a husband’s common-law duty to support her continued.281 As civil di-
vorce “from the ‘chains of matrimony’” became more common, however, 
English courts ceased to distinguish between legal separations and absolute 
divorces and began to award alimony in both causes of action.282 Courts 
making this shift failed to “explain,” however, “why parties, who [a]re no 
longer married, remain[] economically bound to one another.”283 
The most fundamental rationale for alimony is privatizing dependency. 
Alimony places the responsibility for supporting the poorer ex-spouse on 
the richer ex-spouse, rather than the public fisc. As the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania declared in the era of coverture, the husband’s “duty of 
maintenance . . . is not to be released, and thrown upon the public, without a 
good reason,” because “as the head of the family and the maker of its 
wealth, he is not to be relieved from a duty which humanity and the rights 
of society demand him to fulfil.”284 “[P]rovid[ing] help for needy spouses” 
through alimony remains “a legitimate and important governmental objec-
tive” under modern law,285 and this concern is obvious on the law’s face, 
with most states defining alimony in terms of a recipient’s need and an ob-
ligor’s ability to pay.286 But requiring an obligor to provide for a former 
spouse’s material needs runs headlong into his claim, also grounded in ne-
oliberalism, to retain his post-divorce market gains. 
Scholars attempt to resolve this conflict by justifying post-marital 
spousal support as a function of partners’ choices during marriage. Under 
some theories, alimony encourages good marital behavior. In states that for-
bid or limit alimony awards in cases of the would-be recipient’s fault, alimo-
ny incentivizes the poorer spouse to remain sexually faithful.287 Other theo-
ries cast alimony in terms of detrimental reliance, with spousal support repre-
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senting compensation for opportunities lost through marriage, whether to de-
velop a career rather than specialize in home production,288 to ally oneself 
with a different partner,289 or both.290 Still other scholars cast alimony as in-
surance for the spouse who undertakes a financially insecure marital role291 or 
ground the obligation in partnership theory.292 Although propelled by egalitar-
ian impulses, each of these accounts speaks the language of economics.293 
Scholars point to benefits the obligor received or harms he created to justify 
extending support obligations after marriage, whose at-will termination may 
create enduring financial inequality between former marital partners. 
Although this reasoning can make good sense, especially in light of the 
modern vision of marriage as an “egalitarian . . . community,”294 it fails to 
convince payors, whose alimony obligations continue to rankle.295 Perhaps 
for this reason states take a different tack, seeking to limit the tension be-
tween privatizing dependency and property rights by reimaging the purpose, 
and thereby restricting the duration, of alimony. Since the no-fault divorce 
revolution, states have moved toward alimony regimes in which judges 
choose between different kinds of time-limited awards, all of which are 
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meant to assist a poorer spouse in attaining post-divorce financial independ-
ence.296 
Consider, for example, the Massachusetts Alimony Reform Act of 
2011.297 The Massachusetts Act defines four kinds of alimony: (1) “general 
term alimony,” or long-term alimony; (2) “rehabilitative alimony,” which 
helps the poorer spouse become economically self-sufficient through further 
education or job training; (3) “reimbursement alimony,” or restitution for a 
spouse’s investment in her partner’s ability to earn income; and (4) “transi-
tional alimony,” which eases the poorer spouse’s transition into her post-
marital life.298 By statutorily defining alternative forms of alimony, Massa-
chusetts encourages judges to order shorter-term awards, the purpose and 
effect of which is to shift the private support responsibility from obligor to 
recipient. 
The Massachusetts Act eschews the lifelong-alimony model not only 
by establishing a menu of short-term alimony options, but also by imposing 
durational limits on long-term alimony. The Act sets the presumed maxi-
mum period of general term alimony as a defined percentage of the mar-
riage’s length, with only unions longer than twenty years giving rise to in-
definite alimony.299 General term alimony also terminates automatically 
upon an obligor’s reaching full retirement age.300 Finally, the Act’s dura-
tional limits may apply retroactively to alimony judgments entered before 
its effective date—including to actions for modification of marital settle-
ment agreements that were incorporated and merged into a divorce judg-
ment.301 
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This last aspect of the Act illustrates just how complicated it can be for 
the law to accommodate the new family freedom. In order to protect an ob-
ligor’s property entitlements by time-limiting alimony, the Act upends pre-
enactment marital settlements in which parties contracted for permanent 
alimony.302 In relieving obligors from the responsibility to meet an ex-
spouse’s dependency needs, the Act sacrifices one former family member’s 
property interest in service of the other’s. 
Viewed in its entirety, the Massachusetts Alimony Reform Act frees 
obligors from long-term post-marital financial obligation by requiring each 
former spouse to support him- or herself after divorce. But limiting alimony 
awards represents, at best, an uneasy truce between privatizing dependency 
and protecting property rights. Although courts may deviate from durational 
limits “in the interests of justice,”303 or style one form of award as another 
to reach results they consider appropriate,304 the “new alimony” effectively 
requires the lower-income spouse to privatize her own dependency.305 But 
this expectation can be unrealistic, especially in long-term marriages: After 
dedicating herself to raising children or supporting a spouse’s acquisition of 
assets, a would-be alimony recipient may never become a self-sufficient seller 
of market labor, resulting in poverty that the minimalist state leaves her to 
endure alone.306 Modern alimony law requires one former spouse to internal-
ize the cost of choices that benefitted the whole family, effectively importing 
assumption of risk principles into even the most intimate of relationships. 
This “disproportionate” allocation of marital gains and losses is not only un-
just, but also seriously undermines the supposedly egalitarian and coopera-
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tive nature of the marital enterprise.307 In the end, the new family freedom 
protects property entitlements over former family members. 
* * * * 
The laws of parentage, cohabitant obligations, and alimony each re-
flect the conflict between core neoliberal commitments to strong property 
entitlements and to privatized dependency. In each of these doctrinal areas, 
the law must elevate one value over the other. If the law opts to make fami-
ly members responsible for each other’s material needs, it risks infringing a 
libertarian vision of autonomy by imposing obligations to which individuals 
did not formally consent ex ante. If the law elects to respect choice about 
obligations, it risks leaving vulnerable dependents without necessary re-
sources unless the state steps in to supply them. These doctrinal problems 
are so difficult because each possible resolution carries a significant cost: 
the first undermines the law’s legitimacy, while the second’s toleration of 
potential suffering threatens the very project of social reproduction.308 
In the face of this conflict, modern family law is consistent in pursuing 
one principle: the private support imperative. Because children depend on 
adults to survive and thrive, the law of parentage explicitly elevates privat-
izing children’s inevitable dependency over adult autonomy.309 Because the 
minimalist state expects all adults to be self-supporting, however, the law 
can appear to vindicate autonomy claims between them, declaring adults to 
have assumed the risk of economic loss by virtue of their intimate “choic-
es.”310 But the tension remains, and creates real doctrinal damage: a schis-
matic law of parentage; a confused law of cohabitant obligations; and an 
unrealistic law of alimony. 
Recognizing how privatized dependency and choice about obligation 
shape modern family law allows us better to understand the doctrine’s cur-
rent structure, its inherent limitations, and why they persist. Armed with this 
knowledge, we can ask both how well these approaches to dependency and 
autonomy suit family law and whether other approaches might be more in 
keeping with intimate life. The next Part takes up these questions. 
III. EVALUATING MODERN FAMILY LAW 
The tension between the new family freedom and privatizing depend-
ency does more than sow doctrinal confusion in the law of family obliga-
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tions. It also reveals the theoretical incoherence and normative unattractive-
ness of modern family law’s dominant paradigm. Neoliberal ideology con-
ceals a foundational paradox: Although neoliberal rhetoric insists that free 
market principles should govern all human activity, the minimalist state de-
pends upon a substructure of family redistribution that violates other core 
neoliberal commitments. And from an external perspective, neoliberalism is 
a poor framework for family law. Not only have neoliberal policies created 
conditions that make it impossible for many families to survive without 
state support, but the outsized emphasis currently placed on families’ eco-
nomic functions also undermines their ability to fulfill other roles more im-
portant to intimate and collective life.  
Despite these failings, neoliberal precepts continue to shape our polity’s, 
and by extension our family law’s, governing principles.311 I therefore suggest 
a few incremental reforms to the current laws of parentage, cohabitant obliga-
tions, and alimony.312 Although these proposals address some injustices of the 
current system, they are partial rather than full measures: Not only do they 
leave untouched the current system of privatizing dependency, under which 
many individuals lack the material resources necessary for family life, but 
they also fail to challenge choice logic, which can corrode affective ties. The 
very way in which these proposals fall short demonstrates the futility of try-
ing to restructure family law within the minimalist state’s artificial con-
straints. Meaningful reform requires rethinking our approaches to both de-
pendency and autonomy, which requires, in turn, reorganizing our entire po-
litical economy around a set of values more suitable to collective life. 
A. Internal and External Critiques of Neoliberal Family Values 
Neoliberal commitments are a poor fit for family law, no matter one’s 
normative priors. From an internal perspective, the family disproves neolib-
eral ideology’s pretensions to totality, for the conflict between privatizing 
dependency and choice about obligations reveals a tension at the center of 
neoliberal political economy. From an external perspective, neoliberalism’s 
approaches to both dependency and autonomy elevate the family’s econom-
ic functions over its intimate ones, stressing and distorting family life in the 
process.  
Modern family law’s inability to fully embrace choice about obliga-
tions reveals the profound paradox of neoliberalism: Its precepts cannot be 
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replicated “all the way down.” The new family freedom carries certain 
strands of neoliberal rhetoric to their logical conclusion, asserting that indi-
viduals acquire family obligations in the same way that they acquire market 
obligations.313 But as I have shown, the law does not govern all intimate 
interactions as market transactions—nor should it. Modern family law can-
not avoid violating at least one neoliberal commitment because, in an age 
when not all families are marital, it is impossible to promote a property-
rights based vision of autonomy while simultaneously making families re-
sponsible for the bulk of dependency needs. The project of organizing so-
ciety along market principles inevitably requires the existence of some insti-
tution to capture and support those who cannot participate in market ex-
change, i.e., the family. For this reason, the new family freedom puts the 
“neoliberal” state to an impossible choice: to either ignore vulnerable citizens’ 
suffering or provide collective support for family life. In the first case, the 
state’s toleration of misery and failure to cultivate future citizens jeopardizes 
its long-term survival.314 In the second, far preferable scenario, the state re-
pudiates core tenets of neoliberalism by stepping in to provide a broader 
array of public goods.315 Neoliberal ideals cannot fully govern family rela-
tionships, lest they undermine broader neoliberal political and economic 
structures. Family law thus disproves the fundamental assertion of neoliber-
al rhetoric, that all aspects of life can be assimilated “into the domain of the 
market.”316 Neoliberalism fails on its own terms, both as a framework for 
organizing family law and as a coherent theory of collective life. This fail-
ure proves neoliberalism to be a contingent historical phenomenon, an ide-
ology that supports our current unequal power relations, rather than an ex-
pression of political truths.317 
This insight, in turn, renders neoliberal principles and commitments 
ripe for challenge. From an external perspective, the present neoliberal sys-
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tem ignores, and therefore occludes, the full range of functions that family 
relationships serve. Although families are and have always been economic 
units, they also further other vital purposes. Family relationships provide 
their members with necessary intangible goods such as community, emo-
tional support, and intimacy, thereby promoting their individual well-being 
and helping them to develop the capacities necessary for collective life. Yet 
modern family law’s approaches to both dependency and autonomy subvert 
these important functions of intimate life, with unfortunate consequences 
for individuals, families, and society.  
Scholars have long decried how the private support imperative denies 
many families the material basis for a flourishing family life.318 Expecting 
families to fully internalize all market risk has proved unrealistic, as neolib-
eral economic policies have made it impossible for many families to meet 
their members’ material needs from their own resources.319 The economic 
inequality which neoliberalism condones also decreases the prevalence of 
marriage, the only family form able to reconcile privatized dependency with 
choice about obligations.320 Without a more supportive state that insulates 
families from the brunt of market forces—whether through tax-and-transfer 
redistribution, protecting workers’ bargaining power, or both—family law’s 
inability to ensure even the basics of family life will continue. 
While the neoliberal approach to dependency is the more foundational 
problem confronting modern family life, choice logic plays a supporting 
and compounding role. The new family freedom rides in tandem with the 
private support imperative, providing the rhetorical justification for, and 
instructing citizens how to govern themselves within, the structural con-
straints of the minimalist state.321 Consistent with its broader project, this 
libertarian vision casts family members as obstacles to, rather than facilita-
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tors of, one another’s autonomy. Thus not only does the new family free-
dom make no provision for inevitable and derivative dependency, but it also 
erodes intimacy, enshrines inequality in relationships, and undermines so-
cial solidarity.  
Choice about obligations creates problems in family law because it 
cannot accommodate the inevitable dependency of family life. This flaw is 
apparent on the face of Henry Maine’s status-to-contract hypothesis, in 
which the triumph of “individual obligation” based upon “free agreement” 
requires the concomitant “dissolution of family dependency.”322 But this 
precondition cannot be achieved; as long as society’s future depends upon 
children, dependency will remain a fact of social and political life.323 There 
are many reasons why, in a society that denies dependents access to collec-
tive resources and makes families responsible for caretaking, it is just to 
redistribute property between intimates. But the new family freedom’s in-
sistence on ex ante choice about obligations prevents it from even compre-
hending such arguments. Because it holds the law to infringe individual lib-
erty when it provides for dependents’ needs in the only way currently prac-
ticable, the new family freedom is untenable as a measure of “family auton-
omy.” 
The new family freedom also takes a distorted view of intimacy and 
personhood. Conceiving of autonomy as choice about obligations defines 
the myriad exchanges between family members as discrete and calculated 
market transactions, rather than recurring interactions in the context of 
closeness and reciprocity.324 As Ira Ellman has explained, “[m]utual gifting 
arising from mutual concern and affection is not the same as a bargained-for 
exchange.”325 The new family freedom not only fails to grasp the nature of 
family interchange, but in doing so risks commodifying intimate relation-
ships. Margaret Jane Radin has described commodification as treating “eve-
rything people need or desire” as “something that is . . . appropriate to buy 
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and sell through a market.”326 Commodification’s treatment of “relation-
ships . . . and moral commitments as monetizable and alienable from the 
self” “undermines personal identity” by denying the centrality of one’s as-
sociations to her self-definition.327 Thus the new family freedom both im-
poverishes our conceptions of intimate relationships and “do[es] violence to 
our deepest understanding of what it is to be human.”328 
The new family freedom further erodes intimacy and personhood by 
entrenching inequality in relationships. For choice about obligations pro-
motes the interests of one family member only: the one with title to proper-
ty. In the context of parental obligations, recognizing an adult’s financial 
freedom would cost an innocent child necessary support, which would 
threaten her ability to develop into an autonomous adult. And “failure to 
intervene” in adult relationships “favors the financially better off party.”329 
In cohabitant relationships, the propertied partner likely had greater bar-
gaining power and may have exercised it to prevent formalizing any obliga-
tions.330 Because cohabitants often do not share a common understanding of 
their relationship, choice logic enshrines the richer party’s vision of the 
connection upon its dissolution, in derogation of his partner’s understanding 
and even his own objective conduct.331 And in the context of alimony, re-
quiring each spouse to support herself post-divorce may allow one partner 
to reap “a disproportionate share of the [marital] gains while the other . . . is 
accorded most of the losses,”332 in contravention of modern marriage’s egal-
itarian ideals.333 The problem in all of these cases is not the unequal distri-
bution of financial resources per se, but the way in which the new family 
freedom fails to consider each family member as of equal worth. One per-
son’s liberty grounds another’s subordination, as the title holder’s property 
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rights outweigh other family members’ interests in living dignified lives.334 
Rather than recognizing the importance of all family members by seeking to 
encourage each one’s self-determination, choice about obligations openly 
advances one intimate’s life projects at the cost of another’s. 
Modern family law undermines not just intimate life, but also social 
solidarity. The failure to provide sufficient collective support for childrear-
ing imperils the state’s survival both directly, by failing to ameliorate the 
negative developmental effects of child poverty, and indirectly, by teaching 
future citizens neither to expect help from nor to provide help to others.335 
The current laws of cohabitant obligations and of alimony reinforce this ano-
mie by requiring each individual to fend for herself, even in intimate relation-
ships. Indeed, the rollback of permanent alimony after long-term marriages 
reproduces in miniature society’s abdication of any responsibility for its citi-
zens’ well-being.336 In this way, modern family law entrenches laws and 
norms that penalize reciprocity, cooperation, and trust, discouraging sharing 
in even the closest relationships.337 With intimate bonds eroded and re-
course to social support limited, it becomes difficult for families and com-
munities to help their members develop the capacities necessary for collec-
tive life. 
Just as the new family freedom prioritizes a certain conception of 
property rights over family flourishing, modern family law elevates the 
family’s economic function over its affective functions. Healthy intimate 
relationships are vital to many people’s well-being, even more so since the 
liberalization of family law has allowed individuals greater leeway to define 
and live their respective visions of family life. But while the family also 
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functions as a unit of production, consumption, and redistribution,338 the 
minimalist state understands and interacts with the family almost wholly in 
these terms.339 Modern parentage law’s approach to children’s dependency 
measures parenting only in terms of financial support and excessively pun-
ishes non-provision, which undermines father-child relationships in low-
income families.340 It also blames and punishes poor men and women for 
their reproductive “choices” to absolve the collective of responsibility for 
meeting children’s needs.341 Similarly, the modern laws of cohabitant obli-
gations and alimony use “assumption of risk” reasoning to provide only 
limited protection for relationship-specific investment, discouraging inter-
dependence and destabilizing intimate relationships’ cooperative, collabora-
tive qualities.342 In this way, modern family law makes it difficult for many 
families to carry out their necessary role in supporting their members’ pur-
suit of the good life.343 
As the above discussion shows, neoliberalism is both plagued by inter-
nal tension and indifferent to the very aspects of intimate relationships that 
contribute to human flourishing. That combination imposes serious costs on 
both family life and collective life. Neoliberalism falls short in defining au-
tonomy within the family for the same reason it ensconces a minimalist re-
lationship between family and state: because it adopts a negative, rather 
than a positive, vision of liberty.344 Just as focusing on noninterference in 
intimate life prevents the state from considering how it could encourage a 
meaningful family life for all, defining autonomy as “freedom from” other 
family members prevents modern family law from better reflecting how 
relationships enable intimates to pursue worthy life projects together.345 Be-
cause neoliberal ideology leaves little space for appreciating how loving, car-
ing relationships—when realized—give family life its emotional and social 
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richness,346 modern family law cannot govern these relationships in a way 
that supports their necessary work in facilitating intimate and collective life. 
B. The Poverty of Neoliberal Reforms 
Although neoliberal principles are a poor match for family life, they 
continue to shape the social, political, and economic structures within which 
family law operates. I therefore suggest some incremental reforms to the 
current laws of parentage, cohabitant obligations, and alimony. Although 
these proposals have some promise, they are inherently limited; their instan-
tiation alone cannot achieve a family law that makes intimate life accessi-
ble, meaningful, and dignified for all. The very shortcomings of these re-
forms demonstrate the fruitlessness of operating within a system of privat-
ized dependency and individualistic freedom. In the end, reorganizing inti-
mate life around different normative commitments will require concomitant 
transformations in our broader collective life.  
1. Parentage Law: Refining the Logic of Incentives 
Although choice-based arguments cannot admit it, children’s inevitable 
dependency restricts the law’s ability to accommodate parents’ autonomy 
interests. Because children cannot provide for themselves and the minimal-
ist state refuses to invest collectively in social reproduction, parents must 
provide the bulk of the material resources necessary for childbearing and 
rearing. Children also require stable emotional relationships with adult 
caregivers in order to develop normally. For these reasons, “society . . . 
needs . . . parents to persist in their role for 18 years, or longer.”347 I there-
fore propose only minor adjustments to make parentage and child support 
law consistent with its own logic: eliminating or reducing paternal child-
support liability in cases of less-than-voluntary sexual conduct and repudi-
ating policies that undermine fathers’ ability to provide economic and emo-
tional support. 
First, I propose revising our approach to financially supporting chil-
dren conceived through sexual assault. Strict liability for sex, which works 
by conflating consent to sex with consent to parenthood, can justify obliga-
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tions arising from voluntary sexual conduct only.348 Rather than imposing 
child support obligations on male rape victims,349 which adds financial in-
sult to bodily injury, states could use resources from crime victims’ funds to 
help support children born as a result of sexual assault. These funds, which 
represent court fines and penalties and private donations rather than tax rev-
enue, are intended to assist crime victims, including by providing compen-
sation for their losses due to crime.350 Although these funds’ resources are 
limited, conception through male sexual assault is such an outlier that this 
policy proposal’s cost is likely to be small. 
We might also reshape the child support obligations of male statutory 
rape victims. The fact that criminal law deems a minor unable legally to 
consent to sex suggests that adolescence qualifies sexual conduct’s “volun-
tariness” in a way that civil law should also reflect. For this reason, states 
might excuse statutory rape victims from paying child support during their 
own years of minority, when the law considers them to be dependent on 
their own parents for support.351 The uncollected sums could be supplied 
through crime victims’ funds or recouped later, by extending the father’s 
liability for a “make-up” period beyond the child’s legal emancipation. 
Second, and more importantly, states should rescind punitive policies 
that interfere with low-income fathers’ ability to support their children fi-
nancially and emotionally. Like other scholars, I propose abolishing penal-
ties for non-payment of child support that negatively affect a parent’s ability 
to earn income, such as suspending drivers’ and professional licenses and 
incarceration.352 These sanctions are doubly counterproductive: Not only do 
they make current or future support payment less likely, but they also dis-
tance children from fathers who fear criminal prosecution for non-
payment.353 The law should instead recognize the ways in which these fa-
thers do contribute to their children’s development by providing informal 
economic support through cash, food, clothing, and diapers, as well as emo-
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tional support through caregiving and role modeling.354 Equitable distribu-
tion statutes could provide a model for quantitatively valuing low-income 
parents’ non-monetary contributions in the child support context,355 or better 
yet, family law and welfare law could rest content with qualitatively valuing 
these contributions. Refraining from quantifying non-monetary contribu-
tions would not only reduce administrative costs, but would also go far to-
ward limiting the state’s extreme interference in low-income families’ 
lives.356 This, in turn, would allow poor parents greater autonomy vis-à-vis 
the state, despite their continuing responsibility for meeting their children’s 
dependency needs. States could also revise their child-support guidelines to 
increase non-resident parents’ self-support reserve and exercise more cau-
tion in imputing income, thereby avoiding the issuance of unrealistic child 
support orders and their heavy tolls. And because the costs of enforcing 
such orders can exceed the sums collected, redirecting public monies from 
inefficient administration to more generous family subsidies could render 
this proposal low-cost or cost-neutral. 
These proposals can blunt some of the current child support regime’s 
worst injustices toward parents, but they do little to ensure that children 
have the material resources and loving relationships they need to grow into 
autonomous adults. Casting children as a cost that parents must internalize 
alone not only stunts the life chances of those born to families of modest 
means, but also precludes conversations about what society owes to de-
pendents and their caregivers. Failure to take any collective responsibility 
for social reproduction not only devalues children, but also artificially insu-
lates the law from the urgent need to grapple with the fact of human vulner-
ability and interdependence. 
2. Cohabitant Obligations: Recognizing a Spectrum of Intimacy 
Because adults, unlike children, are not as a class inevitably depend-
ent, it is easier to respect choice about obligations in disputes between them. 
But doing so requires cohabitant law to reflect the heterogeneous ways in 
which adults choose to structure their intimate lives. Cohabitant relation-
ships “occupy a continuum that includes couples who have made an express 
decision not to marry, couples who thought that they were in a committed 
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relationship . . . and others who formed contingent relationships that inten-
tionally left open the future of the relationship.”357 If not all cohabitant rela-
tionships reflect the same degree of commitment,358 and all reflect different 
“intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs,”359 then we have 
good reason to regulate them disparately. I therefore propose adopting a set 
of legal rules tailored to different kinds of cohabitant relationships. 
The obvious difficulty with this suggestion is determining which rules 
should govern which relationships. One possible approach is to use length 
of cohabitation as a proxy for the partners’ interdependence.360 States might, 
for example, presume that childless cohabitations of fewer than two years 
do not entail redistribution,361 whereas cohabitations lasting five years or 
longer reflect enough interdependence that the jurisdiction’s marital regime 
should govern.362 In cohabitations of intermediate length, neither presump-
tion would apply and partners could bring any applicable legal and equita-
ble claims. Although I suggest using relationship length as a proxy because 
its objectivity could encourage predictability and therefore settlement, there 
are likely better methods for tailoring cohabitant obligations. For example, 
the project to assign discrete and limited obligations based upon cohabit-
ants’ conduct is promising as a more targeted means to balance autonomy 
and dependency concerns.363 
Again, however, the failure to challenge neoliberal approaches to de-
pendency and autonomy yields an unsatisfactory result. From a practical 
perspective, these proposals are both inefficient to administer and deeply 
invasive of couples’ privacy. The need to operate in the absence of family 
formalities also increases the risk of erroneous classification, the costs of 
which can be high and regressive.364 More fundamentally, these proposals do 
little to change the underlying economic realities that cause many couples to 
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cohabit in the first place.365 Although some couples do avoid marriage for 
ideological reasons, it is hard to argue that respecting cohabitants’ “choices” 
increases their autonomy when, given sufficient economic resources and 
security, they might have selected a different intimate arrangement.  
3. Alimony: Frontloading Spousal Support 
Attending to relationship length, as I propose in the context of cohabit-
ant disputes, can also help in assessing recent trends in alimony law. Re-
forms like Massachusetts’ promote obligors’ post-divorce financial freedom 
by decreasing the duration of alimony awards across all lengths of marriag-
es.366 Alimony intended to rehabilitate, reimburse, or assist a recipient with 
transitioning after a short-term marriage can promote her autonomy, as well, 
by aiding her in achieving a reasonable post-divorce status quo. Indeed, 
judges’ ability to award limited-term alimony may even increase the per-
centage of ex-spouses who receive some form of alimony.367 
But limiting permanent alimony can be seriously unjust to homemaker 
spouses in long-term marriages, whose attention to family caregiving leaves 
them with decreased post-divorce earning capacity. One alternative to per-
manent alimony in high-asset, long-term marriages is to increase homemak-
er spouses’ portion of the marital estate by codifying differentials in post-
divorce incomes as cause to deviate from an equal distribution of marital 
property.368 Equitable distribution statutes usually instruct judges to consid-
er whether a distribution “is in lieu of or in addition to alimony,”369 suggest-
ing that spousal support becomes less necessary when dependent spouses 
receive large shares of the marital estate. 
Redistributing resources between former spouses through unequal di-
vision of marital property, rather than long-term alimony, accommodates 
autonomy concerns in several ways. First, distribution of marital property 
can be justified by partnership principles as well as by domestic relations 
law: Because both partners contributed to the joint enterprise of their rela-
tionship, each partner has an entitlement in property accumulated during the 
marriage. Second, because property can be invested to generate income, an 
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individual receiving a large enough estate upon divorce could become eco-
nomically self-supporting without further aid from her former spouse or the 
state. Finally, if a distribution of marital property is in lieu of spousal sup-
port, then the marriage’s economic ties are severed with divorce, consonant 
with both choice logic and “clean break” norms. This promotes the payor’s 
autonomy by safeguarding his post-divorce income stream, but also saves 
the recipient from having to supplicate her ex-spouse for the alimony check 
on a monthly basis. 
This proposal’s downside is that it has little effect where the marital es-
tate is small—that is, in most marriages.370 In these cases, spouses receive 
little property upon divorce and support claims lie against payors who likely 
cannot pay.371 In these families, both former spouses may be struggling to 
make their way in the market, a state of affairs that redistributing between 
them cannot remedy. Unequally distributing property in high-asset marriag-
es certainly helps homemaker spouses in the highest income brackets,372 but 
does nothing to increase the resources available to less fortunate individuals 
just as deserving of a meaningful family life. 
* * * * 
Each of these proposed reforms is partial and unsatisfying, for the ne-
oliberal framework’s insistence upon privatized dependency and choice 
about obligations severely limits our scope of action. Truly reforming fami-
ly law will require dismantling these artificial constraints. An important first 
step in this project is deconstructing neoliberal ideas and rhetoric and offer-
ing in their place a different normative paradigm, one that embraces a less 
individualistic, more collective approach to both autonomy and dependency. 
I close with some preliminary thoughts as to how this might look in the law 
of family obligations. 
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A SUPPORTIVE LAW OF FAMILY OBLIGATIONS 
The conflict between choice about obligations and privatizing depend-
ency reveals an insoluble tension between modern family law’s governing 
principles. This tension, in turn, proves the incoherence of the underlying 
normative framework, exposing neoliberalism for what it is: an ideology 
that entrenches current political, economic, and social power structures.373 
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Recognizing neoliberalism’s ideological function is the first step to-
ward loosening its grip. For modern family law’s deepest flaw is not its in-
ternal inconsistency, but rather the way in which its normative commitments 
constrain our moral imagination.374 Neoliberal principles not only limit the 
tools we can employ to resolve pressing problems of intimate life and social 
organization, but also restrict the very questions we can pose about these 
subjects.375 In its modern iteration, the private support imperative precludes 
the possibility of collective responsibility for social reproduction, from 
which all benefit, by forestalling discussion of redistributive alternatives, 
such as robust unemployment insurance, collective support for caretaking, 
or a basic wage.376 Privatizing dependency also unjustly penalizes individu-
als for misfortune arising from little or no fault of their own.377 Similarly, 
choice logic’s embrace of an individualistic, negative conception of free-
dom prevents us from debating what a good life requires and society’s 
proper role in helping its members achieve it. On multiple levels, the ne-
oliberal governance project undermines both family relationships and col-
lective life. 
Freed from neoliberal constraints, however, we could restructure fami-
ly law to support intimate life. Doing so requires an approach to dependen-
cy that guarantees to all the material preconditions for family life, as well as 
a vision of autonomy that both recognizes the value of relationships to indi-
vidual and collective life and is compatible with substantive equality. With 
their understanding that true freedom cannot be negative—that individuals 
require vibrant intimate, social, and political communities in order to live 
the good life—paradigms based upon human flourishing, human capabili-
ties, and relational autonomy may satisfy these criteria.378 Under whichever 
paradigm post-modern family law eventually adopts, the state should rec-
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ognize families’ vital role in facilitating their members’ well-being and ac-
tively support their performance of this important work.379 
Reforming family law begins with rethinking our broader political 
economy, but it does not end there. A world of robust collective responsibil-
ity for social reproduction will not be a world without family obligations, 
for the simple reason that relationships and intimacy cannot exist without 
commitments and corresponding duties. Obligations—whether legal or 
moral—are the gravitational force of relationships and the glue of society, 
enabling us to engage others’ cooperation and collaboration in working to-
ward our projects and goals.380 Family obligations not only help us instru-
mentally to pursue our visions of the good life; they also express important 
aspirations about what that life entails, as well as shape who we are.381 In-
deed, constitutional law seeks to protect family life precisely because of the 
vital role relationships play in helping us to develop and express our per-
sonhood, however we may define it.  
Private family law should similarly recognize the ways in which the 
right kinds of obligations sustain intimate and collective life, and seek to 
structure family responsibilities accordingly. This project requires answer-
ing questions about whom the law considers family members, on what ba-
sis, and the proper scope of their entitlements and duties, as well as which 
distributive principles should guide these decisions.382 Depending on the 
answers we give, we may yet succeed in linking family relationships with 
freedom.  
Whereas choice about obligations and the private support imperative 
cannot be reconciled, richer conceptions of autonomy can co-exist with, and 
even depend upon, obligation. For a life without obligations is a life without 
connections, which might be “free” in a negative sense but falls short of 
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flourishing. In its best iteration, the law of family obligations would be nei-
ther a historic remnant nor a neoliberal tool, but rather a functional frame-
work that instructs and supports intimates in their interconnected pursuit of 
a good life. 
  
 
